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I. Introduction
When Congress created the Medicare program in 1965, its purpose was to
provide hospital and medical insurance for persons over the age of sixty-five,
not to accomplish broader societal goals. The original Medicare statute' and its
legislative histor/2 indicate a congressional intent to provide health insurance
coverage for a specific group of people. At that time, Congress viewed the
availability of health insurance for the elderly more as a means to avoid
dissipating their assets than as a means to eliminate financial barriers to care.3
Some advocates and some members of Congress envisioned the 1965
legislation as merely the first step in providing more comprehensive benefits
and expanding eligibility to persons under the age of sixty-five. However, no
persuasive evidence exists that in 1965 Congress intended to use the Medicare
program as a mechanism to support the healthcare infrastructure, assist non-
beneficiaries, or improve the health status of the broader community5 In fact,
Congress explicitly provided that the Medicare program should only pay
providers for the costs of treating Medicare beneficiaries and not for the costs
of treating any other patients.
Despite that limited original purpose, the Medicare program has become a
vehicle to accomplish public goals that go beyond covered services and beyond
I. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. H.R. REP. No. 89-213 (1965); S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965) (reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943); CONF. REP. No. 682 (1965) (reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943).
3. THEoDoRE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 96 (2d ed. 2000). Marmor
explained:
A program of hospital insurance identifies the aged's problem not as the
inaccessibility of health services, but the financial consequences of using those
services .... The hospital benefit was designed, however, not so much to cope
with all the health problems of the elderly as to reduce their most onerous financial
difficulties.
Id. at 12-13.
4. See id. at 95-96 (describing expectations for future expansion of eligibility to
children, pregnant women, and others).
5. The only possible exception is a very ambiguous statement in the legislative history to
the effect that apart of the cost of educational activities "should be considered as an element in
the cost of patient care, to be borne to an appropriate extent by the hospital insurance program."
S. REP. No. 89-404, at 36 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977; see also H.R.
REP. No. 89-213, at 32 (1965) (containing the identical statement); see infra notes 203-08 and
accompanying text (discussing Congress's failure to clearly address these possibilities).
6. See infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text (recounting the congressional mandate




eligible beneficiaries. These broader goals are pursued by: (1) threatening to take
funding away from providers who fail to do certain things, such as provide indigent
emergency care; (2) giving additional money to providers who actually do certain
things, such as provide graduate medical education; (3) regulating certain aspects of
the private insurance market, such as prohibiting the sale of supplemental insurance
policies that fail to meet federal requirements; and (4) educating enrollees about
matters of health and insurance, by distributing written materials and utilizing the
intemet, for example.
In amendments to the original Medicare statute, Congress directed the
Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the
Secretary) to assist Medicare beneficiaries in purchasing goods and services not
covered by the Medicare program. The federal government now regulates-or
assists states in regulating-the commercial market for Medicare supplemental
insurance,7 and the Secretary operates a "beneficiary assistance program" to help
Medicare beneficiaries with the receipt of services under health insurance programs
other than Medicare. 9 Recently, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) relied on this
statutory authority in its effort to assist Medicare beneficiaries in purchasing non-
covered outpatient prescription drugs by means of a Medicare-endorsed prescription
drug card assistance initiative.' ° In addition to helping Medicare beneficiaries
obtain non-covered goods and services, Congress has used the Medicare program to
assist non-beneficiaries, by using Medicare participation as a "jurisdictional hook"
for provider mandates that apply to non-Medicare patients as well as Medicare
patients. These mandates include requirements for participating hospitals to provide
emergency care without regard to a patient's ability to pay, to advise patients about
their rights to refuse treatment and make advance directives, and to participate in
other government payment programs."1 Finally, Congress uses Medicare funds for
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2000). See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (reporting
government efforts to assist beneficiaries with supplemental insurance and other such services).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-3 (2000). See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (reporting
government efforts to assist beneficiaries with supplemental insurance and other such services).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 395b-3(a) (2000); see also Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card
Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,618, 56,620 (Sept. 4, 2002) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
403) ("For several years we have offered Medicare beneficiaries education and assistance in
accessing several non-covered benefits that are complimentary to Medicare, Medicaid, and other
health insurance programs.").
10. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
10,262 (proposed Mar. 6, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 56,618 (final rule) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
403). See infra Part II.B (exploring this initiative in detail). As described below, this issue has
been resolved as a practical matter by enactment of the Medicare prescription drug legislation.
See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
I1. Infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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the benefit of the broader community by paying for public goals such as medical
education and indigent care.
The National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) recognized the importance
and complexity of these issues by forming a "Study Panel on Medicare's Larger
Social Role," which issued its final report in February 1999.2 According to the
NASI study panel, Medicare's broader social roles are important both politically and
socially, but the financing of public goals should be considered as policy issues
apart from the ongoing debate about preserving and reforming the Medicare
program.' 3 Subsequently, two of the contractors for that NASI study panel, Michael
Gusmano and Mark Schlesinger, published a more detailed analysis of Medicare's
broader social roles, which they described as "collateral functions."'14 Gusmano and
Schlesinger considered current and potential uses of the Medicare program from the
perspectives of policy analysis and organizational analysis and developed useful
criteria to consider the appropriateness of using Medicare to accomplish broader
public goals.' 5 They concluded that the Medicare program should remain involved
in particular collateral functions, but only if these functions are carried out in "a
more systematic and cohesive manner."'
This Article adds a new dimension to the previous research on Medicare's
broader public goals by analyzing the broader uses of Medicare from a legal
perspective. Consideration of legal issues can advance our understanding of
Medicare in several ways. First, by analyzing each of the specific statutes that
granted new authorities and new responsibilities to the Secretary, one can better
understand how the role of Medicare has expanded over time. In particular, one can
evaluate whether Medicare has been expanded in a calculated and strategic manner
to accomplish an identified mission. Alternatively, one can determine whether
Medicare has been expanded in a reactive posture to address a series of unrelated
concerns. Second, the legal perspective on the broader goals of Medicare will
consider statutory mandates that have not been analyzed by some of the writers on
social theory and policy analysis.' 7 Previous research has addressed each of these
12. NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., FINAL REPORT OF THE STUDY PANEL ON MEDICARE'S
LARGER SOCIAL ROLE: MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL CONTRACT (1999) [hereinafter
NASI], available at http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/med-report soccontract.pdf.
13. Id. at45.
14. Michael Gusmano & Mark Schlesinger, The Social Roles of Medicare: Assessing
Medicare's Collateral Benefits, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 37 passim (2001).
15. Id. at38-40.
16. Idat at40.
17. The NASI study panel considered Medicare's role in subsidizing public goals such as
graduate medical education, disproportionate share hospitals, and some research activities, but
did not consider beneficiary assistance with non-covered goods and services or provider
mandates that apply as well to non-beneficiaries. See NASI, supra note 12, at 23-25 (stating
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statutory mandates and public goals in depth but in isolation from each other. This
Article takes a different approach by considering these broader uses of Medicare in
juxtaposition and as part of a coherent whole. By necessity, this effort will require
consideration of many different aspects of the Medicare program with greater
breadth than depth. Finally, the legal perspective in this Article will provide an
additional way to evaluate potential uses of Medicare by analyzing the existing legal
authority of the Secretary and by considering which laws, if any, would need to be
changed in order to use the Medicare program to accomplish new public goals in the
future.
Part I of this Article analyzes how the Medicare program currently assists
Medicare beneficiaries to purchase goods and services not covered by Medicare.
Part II addresses the use of Medicare as ajurisdictional hook to impose mandates on
participating providers for the benefit of non-Medicare beneficiaries as well as
beneficiaries. Part 11 deals with the use of Medicare funds to pay for social goals
that benefit the broader community and analyzes judicial views with regard to the
nature and purposes of the Medicare program. Finally, Part IV departs from the
status quo to explore potential uses of Medicare to accomplish broader public goals
in the future.
f. Assisting Medicare Beneficiaries to Purchase Goods and Services that Are
Not Covered by Medicare
A. Promotion of Supplemental Insurance Coverage and Beneficiary Assistance
In one of the first sections of the original Medicare legislation, Section 1803 of
the Social Security Act, Congress explicitly preserved the right of beneficiaries to
purchase other types of health insurance. 8 Rather than merely permitting
individuals to purchase additional coverage, the federal government takes a much
that the reasons for the ancillary duties of Medicare are to be accountable to both enrollees and
to taxpayers and as a means to support more general public health and social policy goals
identified by Congress). Like the NASI panel, Gusmano and Schlesinger did not address the
use of Medicare as a jurisdictional hook for provider mandates that are designed to assist non-
Medicare beneficiaries as well as beneficiaries, although they did address some aspects of
beneficiary education. See Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 42 (discussing steps the
Health Care Financing Administration is taking to be a "patient-centered value-based purchaser"
by providing beneficiaries with information about benefits, insurance plan options, and
treatment options).
18. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1803, 79 Stat. 286, 291
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b (2000)) ("Nothing contained in this title shall be
construed to preclude any State from providing, or any individual from purchasing or otherwise
securing, protection against the cost of any health services.").
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more active role in the market for supplemental insurance known as Medigap.
Since 1980, Congress and the Secretary have actively assisted Medicare
beneficiaries in purchasing insurance coverage for goods and services not covered
by the Medicare program, as well as insurance coverage for Medicare copayments
and deductibles. This federal initiative in the private insurance market takes several
forms, including providing information and counseling to beneficiaries with regard
to supplemental insurance, regulating the private market for Medigap insurance or at
least promoting and supervising a system of state regulation, and, in practical effect,
using the Medicare program to subsidize the purchase of commercial Medigap
insurance.
All health insurance policies have limitations, but Medicare is uniquely
burdensome to its beneficiaries in two important respects. First, Medicare does
not have an upper limit or "cap" on the beneficiary's obligation for cost-
sharing, in contrast to most employee group benefit plans.' 9 Second, Medicare
generally provides no coverage for outpatient prescription drugs.20 Under these
circumstances, the vast majority of Medicare beneficiaries have obtained some
type of additional coverage, although statistics vary depending on the types of
additional coverage included in the calculation.2' Approximately one-fourth of
Medicare beneficiaries have Medigap coverage.22 Of course, Medigap
insurance is not a panacea: Premiums may be expensive, benefits are limited,
some policies provide no coverage for prescription drugs, and even those that
provide prescription drug coverage are subject to significant limitations.23
19. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-533T, MEDIGAP, CURRENT POLICIES
CONTAIN COVERAGE GAPS, UNDERMINE COST CONTROL INCENTIVES 7 (2002) [hereinafter
MEDIGAP] ("In Medicare, the lack of dollar limits on beneficiaries' cost-sharing obligations-
deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments-puts beneficiaries with extensive health care needs
at risk for very large expenses for Medicare-covered services."), available at
http://www.gao.gov/index.html; see also Adam Atherly, Supplemental Insurance: Medicare's
Accidental Stepchild, 58 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 131, 132-33 (2001) (describing the possibility
of large out-of-pocket expenses for Medicare beneficiaries).
20. See MEDIGAP, supra note 19, at 2, 7 (stating that prescription drugs are of growing
importance in treatment and are rapidly increasing in cost). But see infra note 81 (regarding
legislation enacted in Nov. 2003).
21. See id. at 3-5 (providing charts that demonstrate the variances in different levels of
coverage, as well as statistics on what other types of assistance Medicare beneficiaries receive);
Atherly, supra note 19, at 134-35 (discussing sources of coverage and policy characteristics).
22. MEDIGAP, supra note 19, at 5. Aside from those beneficiaries who have Medigap
coverage, approximately one-third of Medicare beneficiaries have supplemental coverage
through an employer, 14% are enrolled in Medicare+Choice plans that generally provide lower
cost sharing and more benefits, and about 17% of the beneficiaries participate in some way in
the Medicaid program. Id. at 4.
23. MEDIGAP, supra note 19, at 8-11. See also U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CHOOSING A MEDIGAP POLICY: 2003 GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE
1256
BEYOND BENEFICIARIES
In 1980, Congress amended Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to add
the new Section 1882 and thereby created a role for the federal government and
the Medicare program in the private market for Medigap insurance.24 The
federal statute specified minimum levels of benefits and required each Medigap
policy to meet an anticipated loss ratio by returning at least a specified
percentage of premiums to the insured in the form of benefits.25 In addition,
the law made abusive marketing of Medigap policies a federal crime.
26
Congress also required the Secretary to develop a program for voluntary
certification of Medigap policies, provided that states could choose to regulate
the Medigap market if they adopted the same or higher standards.27
Allowing states to regulate Medigap insurance is consistent with the usual
allocation of authority to regulate the business of insurance under the federal
McCarran-Ferguson Act.28 The current statutory scheme, however, appears to
be somewhat unique in two respects. First, it requires an ongoing federal role
by the Secretary in reviewing state regulatory programs for Medigap insurance
in order to determine whether those state programs continue to meet all of the
13-15 (2002) [hereinafter CHOOSING A MEDIGAP POLICY] (outlining Medigap and its various
options and limitations), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/021 10.
pdf.
24. Act of June 9, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 507(a), 94 Stat. 441, 476 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2000)).
25. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-87-8, MEDIGAP INSURANCE: LAW HAS
INCREASED PROTECTION AGAINST SUBSTANDARD AND OVERPRICED POLICIES 2 (1986) [hereinafter
MEDIGAP INSURANCE], available at http://www.gao.gov/index.html.
26. Id. Congress had held hearings with regard to allegations of abusive sales tactics in
the market for supplemental insurance, and received information that was based on anecdotes.
Atherly, supra note 19, at 138-39. See David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73
IND. L.J. 797, 802 n.22 (regarding Congressional reliance on anecdotes in considering proposed
legislation).
27. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-944, at 75 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1392,
1422-24; see also MEDIGAP INSURANCE, supra note 25, at 2 ("[l]f a state has adopted laws
and/or regulations that are at least as stringent as the [National Association of Insurance
Commissioners'] model and the federal loss ratio requirement, policies regulated by the state are
deemed to meet the federal requirements."). By 1986, almost all states adopted regulatory
programs that met those standards. Id. at 3-4.
28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (2000) (declaring that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several states of the business of insurance is in the public interest); see generally
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999). Subsequently, Congress used the same allocation
of federal and state authority in the Newbom's and Mother's Health Protection Act of 1996, by
permitting continued state regulation of so-called "drive-through deliveries" if the applicable
state law met the standards set forth in the federal statute. Newborn's and Mother's Health
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (codified in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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federal requirements.29 Second, by enacting the 1980 federal law as part of
Title XVIm of the Social Security Act, Congress made federal oversight of
private supplemental insurance an integral part of the public Medicare program.
In 1990, Congress made additional changes to the Medigap regulatory
scheme in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA),30 including
standardization of benefit packages under 10 different policies3I and a specific
period for open enrollment regardless of health status.32 In addition, Congress
required the Secretary to establish "a health insurance advisory service
program," which also is referred to as the "beneficiary assistance program."03
The purpose of this program is to help Medicare beneficiaries "with the receipt
of services" through other health insurance programs as well as through
Medicare and Medicaid.34 Congress directed the Secretary to provide
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(b)(2) (2000) ("The Secretary periodically shall review State
regulatory programs to determine if they continue to meet the standards and requirements
specified in paragraph (1).").
30. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4351-4361,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-127 to 1388-141 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
31. MEDIGAP, supra note 19, at 5; see also CHOOSING A MEDIGAP POLICY, supra note 23,
at 15 (displaying a chart of allowable Medigap plans A through J); Vencor Inc. v. Physicians
Mut. Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing an amendment of the NAIC
Model Regulation to establish ten standardized plans).
32. OBRA § 4357; see also id. § 4352 (guaranteeing renewability); Atherly, supra note
19, at 139-40 (discussing specific reforms). Subsequently, Congress made further amendments
with regard to benefit packages and requirements for guaranteed issue in the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4031-32, 111 Stat. 251,359(1997). See MEDIGAP', supra
note 19, at 5 (citing changes that the act made to specific benefit plans); Atherly, supra note 19,
at 142 (listing changes made by the act).
33. OBRA § 4359. Two years earlier, Congress had directed the Secretary to create and
distribute a notice of the benefits available under Medicare as well as the types of benefits that
are not available under Medicare. Act of July 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 223(a), 102 Stat.
683, 747 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-2(a) (2000)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(e)
(2000) (explaining the duty of the Secretary to provide information on supplemental insurance
to persons entitled to Medicare benefits "and, to the extent feasible, to individuals about to
become so entitled"). That statute is apparently unique and potentially significant in authorizing
the Secretary to assist persons who are not yet eligible for Medicare but will be eligible in the
future.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-3(a). The Secretary's authority to assist beneficiaries "with the
receipt of services" appears to be broader than the mere authority to provide information and
counseling, and arguably would permit the Secretary to act as ombudsman or advocate in
helping Medicare beneficiaries to actually obtain services from supplemental insurance carriers
in cases of benefit denial under Medigap policies. That broad interpretation of the Secretary's
authority is also supported by the reference to "information, counseling, and assistance" as three
apparently distinct functions in subsection (c) of the statute, which implies that assistance could
involve more than simply providing education and advice. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-3(c). As the
Secretary and CMS explained in support of their final rule for the Medicare-endorsed
prescription drug card initiative, "[t]he requirement that the beneficiary assistance program
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assistance with regard to Medicare, Medicaid and Medicare supplemental
policies, and to provide "such other services as the Secretary deems appropriate
to increase beneficiary understanding of, and confidence in, the Medicare
program and to improve the relationship between beneficiaries and the
program."35 Although somewhat ambiguous, that statutory language may
provide significant authority for the Secretary to assist Medicare beneficiaries
in ways that go far beyond the receipt of covered benefits under the Medicare
program.
36
The informational and educational aspects of the beneficiary assistance
program include activities performed directly by the federal government as well
as activities performed by state agencies with federal financial support.
Congress authorized the Secretary to make grants to states with approved
Medigap regulatory programs in order to provide health insurance information
and assistance to Medicare beneficiaries,37 and authorized appropriations for
that purpose from the Medicare trust funds. 38  As its part of the overall
educational effort, the federal government provides information with regard to
health issues as well as insurance issues. This information is available to the
public regardless of eligibility for Medicare.39
provide assistance, in addition to counseling and information, suggests that the Congress
contemplated more than the provision of information." Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug
Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,618, 56,621 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 403).
35. 42 U.S.C § 1395b-3(c) (2000).
36. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,621 (Sept. 4, 2002) (arguing that the statutory language grants the Secretary the authority to
provide a discount card program). As discussed below, the Secretary and CMS also relied on
that provision in adopting their final rule for the Medicare-endorsed prescription drug card
initiative. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (describing how CMS concluded that
it had such authority).
37. OBRA, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4360(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-138 (1990) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395B-4(A) (2000)).
38. OBRA § 4360(0 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-4(g) (2000)).
39. For example, on its Web site at http://www.medicare.gov, CMS provides health
information and links to further information. The site is accessible to anyone with Internet
access, without the need for any password or beneficiary identification number. In addition to
an interactive tool entitled "Medicare Personal Plan Finder," the site includes "Stay Healthy"
information and comparisons of quality at some types of healthcare facilities. In addition, CMS
operates a National Medicare Education Program (NMEP), which is designed primarily to
provide information with regard to beneficiary choices in regard to the Medicare+Choice
program. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01 -1071, MEDICARE: PROGRAM
DESIGNED TO INFORM BENEFICIARIES AND PROMOTE CHOICE FACES CHALLENGES (2001)
(discussing NMEP activities, expenditures, funding sources, and the reactions and challenges to
NMEP), available at http://www.gao.gov/index.htm.
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The actual effects of these informational and regulatory activities are
difficult to measure, but nevertheless some conclusions can be drawn. First,
regulation has improved the operation of the private market for Medigap
insurance by reducing fraudulent and abusive marketing practices and by
standardizing the products into ten allowable benefit packages. Standardization
has made it easier for beneficiaries to compare Medigap policies and select a
policy that meets their needs, reduced their search costs, and promoted price
competition by Medigap carriers.4 ° In these ways, government regulation of the
market has been effective in encouraging competition and providing a remedy
for market failure.4" Standardization of benefit packages, however, reduces the
ability of consumers to select only those elements of coverage that they desire,
and thereby prevents the market from efficiently allocating resources in
accordance with consumer preferences.42
In addition, by promoting and facilitating the purchase of supplemental
coverage, the federal government is increasing the costs of the Medicare
program. Studies have clearly shown that supplemental insurance is associated
with higher Medicare costs, and there is also persuasive evidence that the
availability of supplemental insurance is a cause of higher Medicare costs.
43
According to the GAO, beneficiaries with supplemental insurance cost the
Medicare program more than beneficiaries without supplemental insurance.44
In a comprehensive review of 118 articles and reports on supplemental
coverage, Adam Atherly concluded that supplemental insurance causes higher
40. See Atherly, supra note 19, at 140-41 (examining the impact of standardization).
41. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-72 (1999) (recognizing that
restrictions on advertising might actually enhance competition in a market characterized by
information asymmetry); Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care:
Regulation, Management or the Market, 37 Aiuz. L. REV. 825, 827 (1995) (stating that the
market failure of inadequate information and consumers' inability to understand the information
justify state regulation of healthcare professionals).
42. See Mark V. Pauly, The Medicare Mix: Efficient and Inefficient Combinations of
Social and Private Health Insurance for US. Elderly, 26 J. HEALTH CARE FTN. 26, 30 (2000)
(noting that "by regulation, if one wishes to buy a Medigap policy that covers prescription
drugs, one is required to include coverage of some of the Medicare cost sharing"). See
generally Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 57-58 (Autumn 2002) (discussing the possibility of consumers making
their own individual choices on the trade-off between cost and quality).
43. See Atherly, supra note 19, at 148-53 (analyzing past studies on the effect of
supplemental insurance on Medicare spending); MEDIGAP, supra note 19, at 12 (explaining that
"Medigap's first-dollar coverage reduces financial barriers to health care, but it also diminishes
beneficiaries' sensitivity to costs and likely increases beneficiaries' use of services, adding to
total Medicare spending") (emphasis added).
44. MEDIGAP, supra note 19, at 12.
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Medicare spending.45 Some researchers have argued that the higher Medicare
expenditures for beneficiaries with supplemental coverage really are the result
of adverse selection, on the theory that those beneficiaries who are more likely
to need expensive healthcare services are more likely to purchase supplemental
insurance coverage.46 Other researchers have demonstrated, however, that even
when supplemental insurance is obtained on a group basis from an employer
with less likelihood of adverse selection, the availability of supplemental
insurance is associated with higher Medicare expenditures. 47 There were
significantly higher expenditures for beneficiaries with individual Medigap
insurance than for beneficiaries with employer group supplemental coverage as
a result of adverse selection. In addition, there were significantly higher
expenditures for beneficiaries with employer group supplemental coverage than
for beneficiaries without any supplemental coverage at all, which resulted at
least in part from the moral hazard of having additional insurance. 48 Thus, the
availability of supplemental insurance, which the federal government facilitates
and promotes, has the effect of increasing the utilization of Medicare services,
increasing Medicare costs, and interfering with federal efforts to control the
cost of the Medicare program. 49 As Mark Pauly has pointed out, the moral
hazard results in the publicly supported Medicare program subsidizing the
purchase of commercial Medigap insurance.50
45. See Atherly, supra note 19, at 153 ("Supplemental insurance leads to increased
Medicare expenditures, although the size of that effect varies from study to study due to
variations in data, study methodology, empirical methodology, and legislative changes.")
(emphasis added).
46. See id. at 150 (citing a study that concluded higher prices were the effect of adverse
selection). Atherly also noted that there is adverse selection for individual Medigap policies
that provide drug coverage, but favorable selection for those individual Medigap policies that
lack drug coverage. Id. at 146, 153.
47. See id. at 150-51 (describing studies which differentiated claims on the basis of group
and individual policies).
48. See id. (citing a study finding employer plans had higher costs than individuals with
no supplemental insurance due in part to moral hazard). See MARK A. HALL, REFORMING
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 11-12 (1994) (distinguishing between the phenomena of adverse
selection and moral hazard).
49. See Atherly, supra note 19, at 151-53 (evaluating the negative effects of the
availability of supplemental insurance). Federal efforts to promote supplemental insurance and
beneficiary education may also improve the understanding, satisfaction, and health status of
beneficiaries, but those effects are difficult to document. See, e.g., id. at 152 (noting that the
effect of Medigap insurance on health status is not clear).
50. See Pauly, supra note 42, at 30 (explaining that "because purchase of private
supplemental coverage increases the expected benefit to be claimed from the tax-supported (and
community-rated) Medicare plan, there is a cross-subsidy to supplemental coverage").
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B. The Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative
The lack of coverage for outpatient prescription drugs has been one of the
most serious gaps in the Medicare program. This deficiency would be a
problem in any health insurance plan, but it is a particular problem for the
elderly, who are much more likely to require regular medication for chronic and
acute conditions. Three-fourths of all Medicare beneficiaries have some
supplemental coverage for a portion of their drug costs, but that coverage may
be extremely limited.5' In addition, millions of beneficiaries have no coverage
at all for prescription drugs.52 These beneficiaries not only have to pay all of
their drug costs out of pocket, but also must pay higher prices than insured
patients who get the benefit of negotiated discounts.
53
Policymakers have attempted to solve these problems in a variety of
different ways. 54  For several years, Congress debated the addition of a
prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program, 55 but progress was delayed
by the problem of cost and by philosophical and political disagreements over
the appropriate roles of the private sector and the government. Some state
governments have expanded their Medicaid programs to provide drug-only
Medicaid coverage for certain individuals who would not otherwise qualify for
Medicaid56 or have created a separate, non-Medicaid program of prescription
51. HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INC., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG
DISCOUNT CARDS: CURRENT PROGRAMS AND ISSUES 3 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter HEALTH POLICY
ALTERNATIVES], at http://www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/get
file.cft&PagelD= 14156 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra
notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing Medicare's coverage, or lack thereof, for
prescription drugs).
52. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
56,618, 56,619 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403).
53. See HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 51, at 3-4 (evaluating the benefits of
discount cards); see also Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67
Fed. Reg. at 56,619, 56,623 (preamble to final rule) (naming some of the challenges for people
without discount cards).
54. See generally MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N (MEDPAC), REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: SELECTED MEDICARE ISSUES 3-32 (June 2000) (discussing possible policy solutions
to Medicare beneficiaries' need for drug coverage), available at http://www.medpac.gov
/publications/congressional-reports/JunOO%20report.pdf.
55. See, e.g., Prescription Drug Benefit and Cost Containment Act of 2003, S. 7, 108th
Cong. (2003) (offering one example of a drug benefit proposal). See also infra note 81 (citing
legislation finally enacted in Nov. 2003).
56. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (deciding that the federal government had no authority to approve Vermont's
Medicaid demonstration project, which had attempted to require manufacturers to pay rebates
without any use of state Medicaid funds).
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drug assistance for residents of the state." In the meantime, pharmaceutical
manufacturers have operated drug assistance programs to help individuals
purchase their products, and a market has developed for prescription drug
discount cards.
Prescription drug discount programs are not a type of insurance. 5' The
issuer of the card does not assume an actuarial risk and does not undertake an
obligation to pay any of the holder's expenses. Rather, the card entitles the
holder to discounts on prescription drugs that the issuer of the card has
negotiated with particular manufacturers or pharmacies. 5' Drug card programs
may be sponsored by organizations such as AARP or by pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs),6° as well as by insurance companies, third-party
administrators (TPAs), retailers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and state
governments.61 Cardholders may be required to pay a fee to the sponsor upon
enrollment or on a periodic basis.62 In addition, pharmaceutical manufacturers
give rebates to the sponsors of discount card programs to increase the sales of
the manufacturers' products.63 Although discount card programs may be
beneficial for consumers, it is extremely difficult and time-consuming for an
individual to determine the value of a particular program and choose the card
that best meets the individual's needs. 4 These problems can be particularly
57. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2001)
(determining that a state may encourage or coerce a pharmaceutical manufacturer to participate
in a state drug assistance program by threatening to treat the manufacturer's products less
favorably under the state's Medicaid program), aff'd sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 155 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2003)).
58. But see HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 51, at 3 n.4 (noting that California
and Washington have attempted to regulate discount drug card programs as insurance
companies).
59. See id. at 3 (describing the benefits of possessing discount cards).
60. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-280R, PRESCRIPTION DRuGs: PRICES
AVAILABLE THROUGH DiscouNT CARDS AND FROM OTHER SouRcEs 3 (2001) (naming sources of
discount cards), available at http://www.gao.gov/index.html.
61. See HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 51, at 4 (listing sponsors of discount
cards).
62. See id. at 3 (charting some discount card enrollment requirements).
63. Id. at vii, 4. The authors of the Kaiser report state: "While rebates flow to the card
sponsor, there is considerable variation in the degree to which the rebates are passed through to
the consumer in the form of lower prices." Id. at vii. Card sponsors also may obtain discounts
from retail pharmacies. Id. at viii. With some understatement, the authors of the Kaiser report
note that "[c]onsiderable tension exists between card sponsors and retail pharmacies." Id. In
addition to extracting discounts on prices and dispensing fees, drug card programs may utilize
mail-order prescription services that tend to limit a retail pharmacy's sales of merchandise as
well as prescription drugs. Id. at viii, 25.
64. See id. (describing the challenges consumers face when trying to choose a discount
card). Among other impediments to comparing prices, card sponsors might describe their
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difficult for those elderly individuals who have multiple prescriptions, physical
or psychological infirmities, and limited access to the internet for use in
comparison shopping.6"
The secretary responded to this market failure by developing a plan for the
Medicare program to officially endorse drug discount cards that meet the
requirements specified by the government. The plan is referred to as the
Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative.66 Under this
plan, the government would not add a prescription drug benefit to the Medicare
program, and the Secretary has made it clear that this plan is merely an interim
measure to provide some assistance to beneficiaries until prescription drug
coverage becomes a reality.67 Although the plan does not require the use of
benefit funds,68 it does expand the role of the Secretary in the private sector and
it constitutes a new use of the Medicare program in helping beneficiaries to
obtain non-covered goods and services. In fact, it appears to be the first time
that the federal government would give the official endorsement of the
Medicare program to non-covered goods or services.69
The adoption of the Medicare-endorsed drug card plan has followed an
extremely tortuous path. The initial plan was published in the Federal Register
on July 18, 2001 as a "summary of proposed collections for public comment.
70
At that time, CMS took the position that its implementation of the drug card
initiative did not require compliance with the rulemaking formalities of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7' The government's initiative was
respective discounts in very different ways, and might advertise that they offer an average
discount from undisclosed list prices. ld.
65. See id. at ix, 26 (detailing challenges to be addressed in discount card programs).
66. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,618
(Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403).
67. See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. at 56,623 ("The administration continues to support
modernizing the Medicare program by adding a drug benefit .... This initiative will provide
Medicare beneficiaries with the educational tools and assistance to obtain some relief on drug
prices, until a Medicare drug benefit can be enacted.").
68. Id. ("This initiative is not a drug benefit, since it does not require the expenditure of
benefit dollars.").
69. Sellers of goods and services are prohibited by law from falsely claiming or implying
that they have the endorsement of the Medicare program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10(a) (2000). See
infra note 104 (describing aspects of Medicare that protect beneficiaries). Although not actually
an "endorsement," a Medigap policy may be "certified" by the Secretary as meeting the
requirements of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(a)(l) (2000) (explaining the certification
procedure); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing state standards for
certification).
70. Emergency Clearance: Public Information Collection Requirements Submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,564 (July 18, 2001).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). See Amy Goldstein, Judge Blocks Prescription Discount
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challenged by the National Association of Chain Drug Stores and the National
Community Pharmacists Association, which filed an action in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia.72 In addition to challenging the
failure to follow APA rulemaking requirements, the plaintiffs argued that the
Secretary had no statutory authority to implement the drug card endorsement
program.73
On September 11, 2001, the district court issued an order granting
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Secretary and
the Administrator of CMS from implementing the program that had been
announced in the Federal Register.74 According to the district court, plaintiffs
had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims on the
grounds of both statutory authority and rulemaking procedure. 75  The
government filed a motion for a stay of proceedings in the district court on
October 10, 2001, while it undertook formal rulemaking on a revised drug card
proposal,76 and the court granted the government's motion for a stay.77 Then,
Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2001, at AI ("The government argued that HHS was not actually
regulating private pharmacy discount programs-but was merely creating a voluntary program
for companies and patients."). CMS requested the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
review and approve on an expedited basis the collection of information, published a notice of its
request to OMB in the Federal Register, and invited public comment on the requirements for
collection of information. 66 Fed. Reg. 37,564 (July 18, 2001). See also Timothy S. Jost,
Governing Medicare, 51 ADMiN. L. REv. 39, 88-96 (1999) (discussing Medicare rulemaking
and sub-regulatory issuances such as manual transmittals and policy statements).
72. See Nat'l Ass'n. of Chain Drug Stores v. Thompson, No. 01-1554, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14417, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction of
implementation of the drug card plan).
73. See id. at * I (stating that the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were "without legal
authority in creating the Medicare Rx Discount Card Program").
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id. at * ("The Court found that plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of their claim that defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act and acted
without legal authority in creating the Medicare Rx Discount Card Program.").
76. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
10,262, 10,262-63 (Mar. 6, 2002) (describing the history of the proposed rule).
77. See Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores v. Thompson, No. 01-1554, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18411, at * I (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2001) (issuing a memorandum opinion to clarify its order
of November 5). As explained in the November 8 opinion, the media incorrectly reported that
the court had lifted its preliminary injunction. Id. Instead, the court had granted a stay because
the government intended to develop a different proposal and comply with formal rulemaking
procedures. Id. at *2-3. The court wrote that "[pilaintiffs are free to return to court at any time
after such a proposal is submitted." Id. at *3. However, the government objected to that
language in the order and related language with regard to the duration of the stay because the
wording might have implied a particular time at which the government's new proposal would be
subject to judicial review. Id. at *1-2. Therefore, the court issued yet another order of
clarification on December 14, 2001, to provide "that the stay will continue until such time as
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CMS published a proposed rule with an invitation for public comments on
March 6, 2002 and formally withdrew the previous proposal of July 18,2001 7
The final rule was published on September 4, 2002, and it became effective on
November 4, 2002.79  However, on January 29, 2003, the district court
permanently enjoined the government from implementing its revised
proposal.80 Initially, it was not clear whether the government would pursue an
appeal of that final order or merely seek additional authority from Congress, or
both, but Congress resolved the issue as a practical matter in November of 2003
as part of the Medicare prescription drug legislation."' Moreover, despite the
ruling of the district court, it can reasonably be argued that the Secretary did
indeed have the authority to implement this proposal without the need for any
additional grant of statutory authority.
82
As described in the final rule, CMS would enter into an endorsement
agreement with any sponsor that files an application and meets all of the
requirements set forth in the rule.83 Successful applicants will be allowed to
defendants' policy is ripe for review." Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores v. Thompson, No. 01-
1554, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20806, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2001).
78. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
10,262, 10,262 (proposed Mar. 6, 2002) ("By publishing this proposed rule, we are formally
withdrawing the program described in the Federal Register on July 18, 2001 .") (codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 403).
79. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
56,618, 56,623 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403) ("This final rule describes a
program that differs in important respects from the Administration's initial proposal from
2001 ...
80. See Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores v. Thompson, 241 F. Supp. 2d 29,30 (D.D.C.
2003) (permanently enjoining the implementation of the proposal that was published in the
Federal Register on September 4, 2002). The wording of the court's order is very sparse.
According to the media, however, Judge Friedman "said it was 'mind-boggling' for the
administration to suggest that existing laws provided legal authority for a program with such big
effects on beneficiaries and pharmacies." Robert Pear & Elisabeth Bumiller, Doubts Are
Emerging as Bush Pushes His Medicare Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2003, at Al 8.
81. See Neely Tucker, Judge Rejects Bush's Drug Discount Plan, WASH. POsT, Jan. 30,
2003, at A7 ("Medicare administrator Tom Scully said the administration would still seek to
implement the idea, through congressional authorization or a further appeal."). The litigation
was stayed pending possible action by Congress. Then, on November 25, 2003, Congress
enacted Medicare legislation that includes statutory authorization for the Secretary to establish a
prescription drug discount card program. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
82. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,621 (arguing that the Secretary has such statutory authority).
83. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 42 C.F.R.
§ 403.804(d) (2002); see also Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative,
67 Fed. Reg. at 56,625 (explaining the conditions of endorsement). The final rule makes some
changes from the initial proposal of July 18, 2001, such as limiting endorsements to those card
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describe and market their discount drug card programs as "Medicare-
endorsed. 84 To be eligible for an endorsement, the sponsor must agree to
enroll all Medicare beneficiaries who wish to enroll in its drug card program
with an enrollment fee of not more than $25, and only Medicare beneficiaries
may enroll in the sponsor's program.8 5 Sponsors also must meet requirements
with regard to their experience, structure, discounts or rebates, access, customer
service, and privacy standards.8 6 Finally, applicants for endorsement must
agree to participate in-and contribute financial support to-a private
administrative consortium with other sponsors of Medicare-endorsed card
programs to disseminate comparative information, monitor the information
distributed by each sponsor, prevent duplicate enrollment of beneficiaries,
ensure legal compliance, and establish a plan to protect the security of health
information.87
In the preamble to its final rule, CMS emphasizes that it does not spend
benefit money on prescription drugs, does not require manufacturers or
pharmacies to provide any discounts, and does not impose requirements on any
organization. 8 CMS describes its initiative as merely establishing the
requirements that it will use in endorsing those discount cards in the private
sector, that would be most valuable for Medicare beneficiaries.8 9 CMS's
programs that can obtain discounts and pass on a significant portion of those discounts to the
consumers. Id. at 56,623. The final rule is based on the same concept as the informal 2001
proposal, however, in that the Medicare program will officially endorse prescription drug
discount cards that are issued by sponsors in the private sector.
84. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,625.
85. 42 C.F.R. § 403.806(c) (2002). In addition, a sponsor may not enroll a Medicare
beneficiary who is already a member of another Medicare-endorsed drug card program because
beneficiaries may participate in only one endorsed program at a time. Id. § 403.811. The
purpose of limiting each beneficiary to one endorsed drug card program at a time is to enable
the sponsor of each card program to obtain the best possible price concessions or rebates from
pharmaceutical manufacturers. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance
Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,618, 56,625-26 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403)
(listing aspects of the initiative).
86. 42 C.F.R. § 403.806 (2002).
87. Id. §§ 403.806(b)(6), 403.810. For example, the administrative consortium will
publish or facilitate publication of price information to help beneficiaries determine which of
the endorsed drug card programs would best meet their needs and will monitor the accuracy of
the representations made by each of the sponsors. Id. § 403.81 0(a)(2)-(3).
88. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,621.
89. Id. ("[T]his initiative does not impose requirement [sic] on any entities-it merely
creates conditions that we will use to endorse card programs that we consider to be appropriate
for beneficiaries.").
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characterization of its role as mere passive endorsement of private sector
services, however, is incomplete and somewhat misleading. Rather than merely
identifying and publicizing the best programs in an existing market for drug
discount cards, CMS essentially is creating a new market for drug discount card
programs limited to Medicare beneficiaries. 90 At the very least, CMS is
shaping the market and the sellers in that market, just as the Medicare program
has shaped the structure and operation of healthcare providers by establishing
conditions of participation for each type of facility.9 As a practical matter,
CMS is offering to enter into a non-exclusive endorsement agreement with any
sponsor that is willing to structure its operations to meet the agency's
conditions.92 Moreover, CMS will play an active role in establishing the
private administrative consortium that will provide a self-regulatory structure
for the market that CMS is creating. 93
CMS characterizes its endorsement program as merely a passive
educational activity because it is relying on the Secretary's authority to educate
and assist Medicare beneficiaries for statutory authority for the program.94 As
described above, 95 Congress authorized the Secretary in Section 4359 of OBRA
to establish a health insurance advisory service, also known as the beneficiary
assistance program. CMS takes the position that its drug card initiative
90. According to a report published by the Kaiser Family Foundation in February 2002,
none of the existing drug discount programs that were surveyed could have met the
requirements set forth in the government's proposal. See HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, supra
note 5 1, at 2 ("It is important to emphasize, however, that the programs that exist today are
different than the discount card programs that are envisioned under the Bush Administration's
proposal."). For example, most of the private sector card programs were open to anyone
regardless of age, and two programs, including the program sponsored by the American
Association of Retired Persons, were limited to persons over fifty years old. Id. at 9. In
contrast, the final rule requires sponsors to limit their drug discount card programs to Medicare
beneficiaries. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 42 C.F.R.
§ 403.806(c)(2) (2002).
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395bbb (2000) (outlining conditions of participation for home
health agencies).
92. See 42 C.F.R. § 403.806 (2002) (setting forth endorsement requirements).
93. See id. § 403.810(b) ("In order to facilitate the formation of the administrative
consortium and ensure that all functions are performed in a timely manner, CMS may assist in
the start-up of the administrative consortium and perform any of the functions in this section for
a transitional period of time."). Although CMS emphasizes that it is not using benefit funds, the
agency will inevitably use administrative funds or at least staff time and resources to perform
those activities for the consortium during the period of transition.
94. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
56,618, 56,620 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403) (citing Section 4359 of
OBRA as authority for the Secretary's action).
95. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (reporting government efforts to assist
beneficiaries with supplemental insurance and other such services).
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constitutes a beneficiary assistance program within the meaning of that statute
and makes several arguments that the statutory language of Section 4359
provides authority for the initiative.96 As CMS points out, Section 4359 directs
the Secretary to assist Medicare beneficiaries with the "receipt of services
9 7
under Medicare. By helping beneficiaries obtain prescription drugs not covered
by Medicare that their physicians routinely prescribe, CMS asserts that this
initiative will enable beneficiaries to more efficiently utilize physician services
that the Medicare program covers.98 In addition, Section 4359 authorizes the
Secretary to provide "information, counseling, and assistance,"99 and CMS
argues that this statutory language contemplates that assistance will go beyond
merely providing information and advice.' 00 The statute also authorizes the
Secretary to provide "such other services as the Secretary deems appropriate" to
promote beneficiary confidence in the Medicare program and improve its
relationship with its beneficiaries. 101 According to CMS, this initiative will
demonstrate to beneficiaries that the Medicare program understands their
concerns about the cost of prescription drugs and is trying to help as much as
possible.10 2 CMS also relies on the Secretary's general rulemaking authority
10 3
96. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,620-21. CMS reiterated that it "believe[d] that this initiative meets the definition of a
beneficiary assistance program." Id. at 56,620.
97. OBRA, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4359, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-137 to 1388-138 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-3(a) (2000)).
98. Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,620, 56,622. CMS cited several studies indicating that some Medicare beneficiaries were
unable to fill the prescriptions ordered by their physicians or failed to take the full doses
recommended by their physicians. Id. "[There is also evidence supporting our conclusion that
access to prescription drugs is an integral part of the health care services delivered by the
Medicare program, and that improving access to prescription drugs directly influences the
effectiveness of Medicare-covered services." Id. at 56,622.
99. OBRA § 4359.
100. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
56,618, 56,621 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403) ("The requirement that the
beneficiary assistance program provide assistance, in addition to information and counseling,
suggests that the Congress contemplated more than the provision of information."); supra notes
35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretary's role in aiding beneficiaries).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-3(c) (2000) (describing the general role of the Secretary in the
Medicare program).
102. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,622 (acknowledging survey data indicating a lack of confidence in the respondents' ability to
pay for prescription drugs once they become eligible for Medicare and explaining how the
initiative should alleviate some of these prescription drug costs).
103. See id. at 56,621 (discussing the general rulemaking authority given to the Secretary,
including the authority to "publish such rules and regulations as may be necessary to the
efficient administrations of the functions with which he is charged"); see also 42 U.S.C.
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and argues that the Secretary is entitled to deference in interpreting the
ambiguous provisions of Section 4359. 104
Despite the somewhat misleading characterization of the initiative as a
passive educational activity, the appellate courts would have been likely to
uphold the authority of CMS to adopt the program as a permissible type of
beneficiary assistance, even without any additional grant of statutory authority.
The agency's arguments with regard to the language of Section 4359 are
reasonable. Therefore, despite the ruling of the district court, appellate courts
would have been likely to give deference to the agency's interpretation of the
statute. 10 5 Although it is unlikely that Congress explicitly contemplated
endorsements by the Medicare program, the drug card program is consistent
§ 1395hh(l) (2000) ("The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the administration of the insurance programs under this subchapter."); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a) (2000) ("The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, respectively, shall make and publish such rules andregulations, not
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the
functions with which each is charged under this chapter.").
104. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at
56,620 (noting that the statute's language is broad, particularly Section 4395(c)'s grant of
authority to provide services that will increase confidence in the Medicare program as the
Secretary deems appropriate). CMS cited the decision of a federal district court that, although
subsequently vacated on other grounds, found Section 4359 to be ambiguous and, therefore,
gave deference to the Secretary's interpretation. See Tex. Gray Panthers v. Thompson, 139 F.
Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding the statute's key terms-"information, counseling, and
assistance"-to be ambiguous and therefore deferring to the Secretary's reasonable
interpretation of the statute), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
11467 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 2002), reh 'g denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12056 (D.C. Cir. June
13, 2002).
In addition, CMS argues that further support exists for its drug card endorsement program
in the federal statute that prohibits giving a false impression that an item is endorsed by the
Medicare program. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67
Fed. Reg. at 56,621-23 (citing Section 1140 of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-I 0(a)(1 ) (2000), which prohibits any person from, among other things, using the word
Medicare "in a manner which such person knows or should know would convey... the false
impression that such item is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the ... Department of Health
and Human Services"). In the preamble to its final rule, CMS argued that this statute, in
conjunction with the other cited statutes, lends further support to its claim of statutory authority
for its endorsement program by implying that Congress contemplated that some claims of
endorsement would not be false. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance
Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg. at 56,621-23 (stating that "Congress understood that in some cases use
of the word Medicare by private parties and organizations will be approved by the Secretary").
However, that is not a strong argument. The statute is equally susceptible to the interpretation
that Medicare would never give its endorsement to products or services in the private sector.
105. See Jost, supra note 71, at 51-56 (discussing the deference that courts give to
interpretations of the Secretary in Medicare cases); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S.
402, 417 (1993) ("[W]here the agency's interpretation of a statute is at least as plausible as
competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to its construction.").
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with the underlying intent of Congress that the Secretary assist beneficiaries in
ways that do not require the expenditure of benefit funds or create any new
entitlement. For all of these reasons, the appellate courts would have been
likely to find that CMS had the authority to implement the drug card
endorsement program.'0 6
As a matter of public policy, this broader use of the Medicare program to
assist beneficiaries in obtaining non-covered goods and services, when
considered in isolation, is fairly innocuous and potentially beneficial. A
potential problem exists, however, with justifying additional functions for
Medicare by characterizing them as beneficiary assistance programs. It is
difficult-if not impossible-to develop a workable rule to determine which
additional functions would be authorized and appropriate for the Medicare
program and which activities, if any, would go too far.
III. Assisting All Patients by Using Medicare Participation as a
Jurisdictional Hook for Provider Mandates
Section 1866 of the Social Security Act, which was part of the original
1965 legislation,'0 7 sets forth the terms to which providers must agree in order
to qualify to participate in the Medicare program and to be eligible to receive
Medicare payments. 05 Unlike the conditions of participation, which are
detailed standards for the organization and operation of specific types of
facilities,' 9 the requirements for provider agreements in Section 1866 apply
106. CMS also points out that it made some changes to the initiative that originally was
announced. See Medicare-Endorsed Prescription Drug Card Assistance Initiative, 67 Fed. Reg.
56,618, 56,623 (Sept. 4, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403) (explaining how the final
rule differs from the initial proposal, including the discount programs the final rule endorses,
additional reporting requirements, and the card programs that are endorsed, among other
distinctions). However, Congress did not change the basic concept of the endorsement program.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the changes, in and of themselves, would lead to a different
outcome on the issue of statutory authority.
107. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1866, 79 Stat. 286, 327-
29 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000)).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000) (outlining conditions which providers must agree to
prior to Medicare participation).
109. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395bbb (2000) (enumerating conditions of participation for
home health agencies); 42 C.F.R. pt. 482 (2002) (detailing conditions of participation for
hospitals). The conditions of participation may also be used to accomplish goals that go beyond
providing covered services to eligible beneficiaries. For example, apart from Section 1866,
Congress has limited participation in Medicare and Medicaid to those hospitals that adopt
written protocols to identify potential organ donors and provide notice of potential donors to
their local organ procurement agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1)(A) (2000) (explaining
organ procurement requirements for program participation). Pursuant to that statute, the
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regardless of the category of facility." ° In the original 1965 version of the
statute, the requirements for provider agreements in Section 1866 merely
limited the types of charges that providers were permitted to make to Medicare
beneficiaries.111 After 1965, however, Congress frequently amended Section
1866 to include many types of affirmative obligations to which providers are
now required to agree.' 
12
Current requirements for providers include obligations to participate in
government payment programs other than Medicare,' 13 to provide emergency
care to non-Medicare beneficiaries as well as to beneficiaries, and to advise
Medicare patients and non-Medicare patients about their rights under state law
Secretary has adopted a specific condition of participation for hospitals with regard to organ
procurement. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (2002) (announcing organ procurement and
transportation responsibilities for Medicare and Medicaid participants).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1) (2000) (applying the statute to "[a]ny provider of
services" with the exception of certain funds established by physicians at teaching hospitals).
I ll. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1866, 79 Stat. 286,
327-29 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000)) (setting out the restrictions with which
providers would have to comply to participate in Medicare).
112. See, e.g., Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No.
99-272, §§ 9121(a), 9122(a), 100 Stat. 82, 164, 167 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc
(2000)) (expanding obligations related to the examination and treatment of emergency medical
conditions and requiring the use of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS) and Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Veterans
Administration (CHAMPVA) payment systems for provider participation); see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.20 (2002) (listing basic commitments of provider agreements).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(I)(J-L)(2000) (requiring Medicare-participating hospitals
to also participate in the CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA programs and to admit military veterans
authorized by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and accept compensation from the VA
as payment in full). In COBRA of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9122, 100 Stat. 82,167 (1986),
Congress added a new subparagraph (J) to Section 1866 to require Medicare-participating
hospitals to participate in the CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA programs, which mandated that
those hospitals accept payments from these programs as payment in full for covered services,
except for deductibles and cost-sharing. See Participation in CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA, 59
Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,087 (June 22, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 489, 1003)
(discussing statutory requirement for Medicare hospitals of participation in CHAMPUS and
CHAMPVA programs); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.25 (2002) (requiring hospitals that participate
in Medicare to also participate in the CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA programs for inpatient
services). The Veterans' Benefits Improvement and Health-Care Authorization Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-576, § 233, 100 Stat. 3248, 3265, requires hospitals participating in the
Medicare program to accept payment for treatment of authorized veterans under the VA's
payment methodology. See Participation in CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA, 59 Fed. Reg. at
32,087-88 (noting that participants must provide care for eligible veterans and then receive
payment for these services under the applicable VA payment system). See also 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.26 (2002) (requiring hospitals that participate in Medicare to admit any VA authorized
veteran and to follow the VA payment procedures for these patients). Interestingly, Section
1866 of the Social Security Act does not require Medicare-participating hospitals to also
participate in the federally-supported Medicaid program.
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to refuse treatment and make advance directives."1 4 The requirements to
provide emergency care and advise patients about advance directives are
described in detail below.
A. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
In the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985,15 Congress
amended the requirements for provider agreements in Section 1866 of the
Social Security Act" 16 and added a new Section 1867, which is known as
EMTALA or the COBRA Anti-Dumping Law.' 17 The statute requires every
114. These requirements are distinguishable from the requirement that Medicare providers
comply with civil rights and anti-discrimination laws because those laws are applicable to
providers independently of Section 1866, without any need for providers to agree to be bound
by those laws. Instead, civil rights and anti-discrimination laws apply to all recipients of
"federal financial assistance," which courts and the Secretary have interpreted to include
facilities participating in Medicare. See, e.g., United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d
1039, 1047 (5th Cir. 1984) (surveying cases that found federal discrimination statutes protective
of Medicare hospitals and agreeing with this conclusion). Although the Secretary requires
Medicare providers to formally agree to comply with civil rights and anti-discrimination laws,
42 C.F.R. § 489. 1 0(b) (2002), those requirements are not included in Section 1866. Moreover,
those laws apply independently of the Social Security Act. A requirement to agree to comply
with laws that are applicable already is redundant and unnecessary. In contrast, the obligations
to which providers are required to agree under Section 1866 are only binding on providers as a
result of the Medicare statute and their agreement to comply.
115. COBRA of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986).
116. Id. § 9121(a), 100 Stat. at 164 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(I)(l) (2000)); see
also 42 C.F.R. § 489.20(m), (q), (r) (2002) (requiring a provider to report to CMS anytime it
receives a patient in an unstable condition from another hospital in violation of the provider
agreement, to post signs describing each patient's rights regarding emergency treatment, to post
signs indicating whether the hospital is a Medicare provider, to maintain medical records for
patients who come to the emergency department, and to keep a list of physicians who are on call
for duty in emergency situations).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). See also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (2002) (describing new
provider obligations). See generally David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past
Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRiX 29 (1998) (analyzing the original case for EMTALA
and speculating about the statute's future in the current health care marketplace); Andrew J.
McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act Against Patient Dumping, 24
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 173 (1989) (describing problems generally associated with patient-
dumping and issues that are likely to arise under the antidumping statute); Lawrence E. Singer,
Look What They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's Implosion, 33 Hous. L. REv. 113 (1996)
(discussing the dramatic effects of EMTALA on malpractice law); Erik J. Olson, Note, No
Room at the Inn. A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1994)
(examining the antidumping laws of COBRA and various states and concluding that they have
been insufficient in curtailing treatment and financing problems in emergency rooms); Lynn
Healey Scaduto, Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act Gone
Astray: A Proposal to Reclaim EMTALA for Its Intended Beneficiaries, 46 UCLA L. REv. 943
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hospital that participates in the Medicare program"' and has an emergency
department to provide emergency services without regard to a patient's ability
to pay.119 Specifically, the hospital must provide "an appropriate medical
screening examination" 1 20 to determine if the patient has "an emergency
medical condition.""'' If the hospital concludes that the patient indeed does
have a medical emergency, then the hospital must provide additional
(1999) (reviewing the legislative history of EMTALA and arguing for a narrowing of the class
of patients to whom it should be applied).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (2002) (defining the term "participating hospital" as a
"hospital that has entered into a provider agreement under section 1866").
119. See Burditt v. Dep't of Health& Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1366, 1368 (5th Cir.
1991) (explaining that execution of the Medicare provider agreement makes EMTALA
applicable); McClurg, supra note 117, at 199-201, 232 (discussing procedures that a Medicare
provider must undertake for all emergency patients and the penalties that accompany a failure to
provide emergency treatment). Required emergency services may not be delayed "in order to
inquire about the individual's method of payment or insurance status." 42 U.S.C. § i 395dd(h)
(2000). Thus, EMTALA does not prohibit hospitals from charging patients after the hospital
provides emergency services, although a large percentage of those bills are likely to be
uncollectible.
EMTALA applies when a person "comes to the emergency department." Id. § 1395dd(a).
Obviously, this phrase needs to be interpreted in a flexible manner, in order to protect a person
who walks in the wrong door of the hospital. The government has had difficulty, however,
developing a reasonable and understandable set of rules to determine where and when
EMTALA obligations are applicable. See, e.g., Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,404, 31,472-77 (proposed May 9, 2002) (announcing
proposed amendments to EMTALA regulations with regard to off-campus facilities). In
addition, there is a dispute as to whether EMTALA obligations apply to inpatients already
admitted to the hospital. See id. at 31,475-76, 31,507 (discussing proposed 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.24(d)(2)).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). The term "appropriate medical screening examination"
is not defined in the statute, but the purpose of the examination is set forth in the statute as
determining whether the patient has a medical emergency. Id. In addition, the screening
examination must be "within the capability of the hospital's emergency department, including
ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department." Id.
In contrast to the community practice standard of malpractice law, the screening
examination must comply with the hospital's own uniform procedure for patients with the same
condition. See Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1992)
("[EMTALA] establishes a standard which will of necessity be individualized for each hospital,
since hospital emergency departments have varying capabilities."). However, a split exists
among the circuits as to whether a plaintiff in a private civil action under EMTALA is only
required to prove that the patient received a disparate screening examination or, alternatively, is
also required to prove a bad motive for a hospital's failure to provide its standard screening. Id.
at 880 n.8. In Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253 & n.I (1999), the Supreme
Court did not resolve that precise issue with regard to screening under subsection (a), but the
Court did note that most appellate courts do not require proof of bad motive for the disparate
screening.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). The term "emergency medical condition" is defined in
§ 1395dd(e)(1) and includes specific applications for women in labor. Id. § 1395(dd)(e)(l).
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examination and treatment to stabilize the condition of the patient or,
alternatively, transfer the patient to another hospital in accordance with the
strict conditions set forth in the statute.'22 If a hospital fails to comply with
these requirements, the government may assess civil monetary penalties and
even terminate the hospital's Medicare provider agreement.'23 In addition, the
statute creates a private civil action for any person who is injured as a result of
a hospital's violation of the law.1
24
The statute is not limited to Medicare beneficiaries, but rather applies to
all patients "whether or not eligible for benefits under this [title]."'25 In fact,
the statute was not enacted to assist persons who are eligible for Medicare.
Congress had expressed its concern about patients who were denied emergency
care because they lacked medical insurance. 26  However, all Medicare
beneficiaries, by definition, have medical and hospital insurance for the costs of
emergency treatment. 12 Moreover, Congress was particularly concerned about
122. Id. § 1395dd(b). Under subsection (c), unless the transfer is requested by the patient,
a physician must certify that the benefits of transfer outweigh the risks. See id.
§ 1395dd(c)(l)(A)(ii) (requiring a transferring physician to certify that the medical benefits of
the transfer are "reasonably expected" to outweigh the patient's increased risks and to include a
summary of the risks and benefits associated with the transfer). Even after a physician's
certification to that effect, a transfer would not be appropriate unless the receiving facility has
sufficient space and agrees to accept the patient and the patient is transferred in a proper vehicle
with qualified staff. Id. § 1395dd(c). See Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F.
Supp. 1269, 1276 (E.D. Tex. 1990) ("[A] 1976 Ford Pinto with no medical equipment, whose
only other occupant besides the patient is her boyfriend, is not the equivalent of an ambulance
for the purposes of the Antidumping Act.").
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(d)(1)(A), 1395cc(b)(2) (2000) (providing a civil penalty of
no more than $50,000 and giving the Secretary discretion in renewing and terminating provider
agreements when a provider has failed to comply with regulations); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f)
(2002) (allowing the Secretary to terminate the provider agreement when a hospital does not
meet its requirements); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-747, EMERGENCY
CARE: EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 17-25 (2001) (detailing the
infrequency with which hospitals are sanctioned for EMTALA violations), available at
http://www.gao.gov/index.html; Singer, supra note 117, at 136, 136 nn. 129-30 (discussing
possible sanctions when a hospital violates COBRA).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (2000). Courts frequently recite that "EMTALA...
was not enacted to establish a federal medical malpractice cause of action nor to establish a
national standard of care." Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir.
2002). However, commentators have recognized the potential for confusion and abuse. See,
e.g., Singer, supra note 117, at 121 ("By inherently raising concepts of malpractice, COBRA's
protections invite overuse by plaintiffs and misuse by the courts.").
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a-b) (2000).
126. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. ],at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
579, 605 (discussing an increase in reports of hospital emergency rooms turning away uninsured
patients). But see Hyman, supra note 26, at 810 n.46 ("[Tihe legislative history is quite clear
that EMTALA was sold to Congress on the basis of a few bad anecdotes.").
127. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 410.28 (2002) (detailing Medicare coverage for outpatient
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women in labor, as indicated by the title of the Act, and few women of child-
bearing age are beneficiaries of the Medicare program. Why, then, did
Congress choose to use Medicare participation as the "jurisdictional hook" for
emergency treatment requirements that were primarily intended to assist non-
Medicare beneficiaries?
The relevant section of the Act is titled "Responsibilities of Medicare
Hospitals in Emergency Cases."'' 28 However, the Act does not explain why an
obligatioh of society to provide indigent care should be borne, without
compensation, by hospitals that provide services to Medicare beneficiaries.
One could argue, perhaps, that some amount of additional bad debt for
emergency treatment is a reasonable quid pro quo for a hospital's privilege of
participating in a lucrative federal purchasing program. In fact, the First Circuit
reasoned that Congress used the financial benefits of Medicare participation as
"a carrot to make health-care providers more receptive to the stick.' 29
However, in the statute, Congress did not articulate that justification or any
other for linking indigent emergency treatment with Medicare.
The legislative history of EMTALA is similarly unhelpful in this regard." °
In committee reports, Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo
and concluded that a federal response was required, 3' but did not address why
the federal response should be implemented as part of the hospital insurance
hospital diagnostic services). As one commentator put it, "using the Medicare program to
authorize and enforce COBRA's antidumping provision is curious since COBRA will have little
effect on Medicare patients." Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening
COBRA 's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1209 & n. 159 (1986) (citing the findings of a study
that found that only 3% of patients transferred to a public hospital were Medicare patients). See
also McClurg, supra note 117, at 232 ("[T]here is little incentive to dump a Medicare
patient.... ").
128. COBRA of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000)).
129. Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189-90 (1st Cir. 1995). See also
Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874 n.1 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Congress sought to end
patient dumping by requiring any hospital receiving federal funds to examine patients who seek
treatment in an emergency department and treat any serious medical condition detected.").
130. See McClurg, supra note 117, at 197 n.106 (explaining that "[t]he anti-dumping
provisions were only a small pan" in the 1986 budget statute); Scaduto, supra note 117, at 946-
48 (discussing EMTALA's legislative history but providing no basis for a relationship between
the statute and Medicare).
131. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 3, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
726, 727 (discussing a growing concern with emergency room care offered to uninsured patients
and endorsing a federal solution to this problem); see also Bryant v. Riddle Mem'l Hosp., 689
F. Supp. 490,492 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("The legislative history of the Act contains much evidence
of Congress's intent to provide a federal cause of action.").
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program for the elderly and disabled. 132 The closest thing to a justification for
using Medicare was a statement made by one of the sponsors, Senator
Durenberger, that EMTALA would "make it clear that the Medicare Program
will not do business with any institution which willfully and knowingly, or
through negligence, turns its back on an emergency medical situation."'
133
Nothing, however, indicates that other members of Congress agreed with
Senator Durenberger's normative approach to participation in Medicare. Nor
was there any serious discussion of the ramifications of adopting value-based
criteria for Medicare participation. 134 Moreover, some confusion existed about
the relationship between Medicare patients and the proposed EMTALA statute,
as indicated by one senator's reference to what he described as "Medicare
dumping." 1
35
In a 1990 EMTALA case, the Sixth Circuit suggested that Congress had
designed EMTALA as a way to impose obligations on those hospitals that had
not received funding under the earlier Hill-Burton program. 3 6 This argument
is a plausible theory because Hill-Burton funds were limited to hospitals
operated by public entities and non-profit organizations. 37 Theoretically,
132. The House Ways and Means Committee did refer to Medicare's relatively new system
of prospective payment as a possible reason that hospitals may be less willing than they were in
the past to treat indigent emergency patients. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27, reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605 ("There is some belief that this situation has worsened since the
the [sic] prospective payment system for hospitals became effective."); see also 131 CONG. REC.
S28,570 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (sponsoring a federal
antidumping program to be implemented through Medicare). Some members of Congress
discussed the use of Medicare exclusion as a means of enforcing EMTALA, but without
discussing why they thought it was appropriate to use the Medicare program as a means of
enforcement. See id. at 528,569 (statements of Sens. Kennedy and Heinz) (stating that
"[m]eaningful enforcement is essential" without explaining why termination of Medicare
reimbursements was a proper enforcement mechanism). Senator Proxmire stated that "it is
crucial that we act promptly to establish the fundamental principle that this behavior will not be
tolerated by Medicare." Id. at S28,570. However, Senator Proxmire did not explain why he
thought that the Medicare program should be involved in the issue of emergency care for
patients who have no health insurance or Medicare coverage.
133. 131 CONG. REc. S28,568 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
134. See infra notes 294-301 and accompanying text (discussing the problems inherent in
using normative criteria for Medicare participation and other government procurement
activities).
135. See 131 CONG. REc. S28,570 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Domenici)
("[A]s I understand this bill ... clearly this is something that has no opposition with respect to
those who are involved in this notion of Medicare dumping.").
136. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1990)
("Apparently dissatisfied with the effect of laws that had been limited to hospitals that received
funds from the government under the Hill-Burton Act, Congress chose to attempt to meet the
perceived evil by enacting the quoted language.") (citation omitted).
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000) (noting that funding was to assist "programs for the
1277
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1251 (2003)
Congress might have concluded that for-profit hospitals, which had not
received Hill-Burton funds or accepted Hill-Burton obligations of free care and
community service, were even more likely than public and non-profit hospitals
to deny emergency care to persons unable to pay. 3 ' Those for-profit hospitals
do participate in Medicare, however, and could be subjected to federal
mandates as a condition of Medicare participation.
Nevertheless, the most reasonable conclusion is that Congress simply used
Medicare participation as the "hook" because it was convenient and it avoided
the constitutional problems inherent in forcing private parties to give away their
goods and services without compensation.' 39 Participation in Medicare is
literally voluntary, even though it is an economic necessity for acute-care
general hospitals. 40 Therefore, courts have consistently rejected constitutional
challenges to Medicare requirements on the basis of the voluntary nature of the
program. 141 Moreover, under the Spending Clause, 142 Congress has the power
to impose conditions on both state and private recipients of federal funds. 1
43
construction and modernization of such public or other nonprofit community hospitals").
However, there were weaknesses in the Hill-Burton program that extended beyond the exclusion
of for-profit providers, including the lack of a private civil remedy, vagueness of its provisions,
and a lack of commitment to enforcement. See Singer, supra note 117, at 132 & n.102
(describing general problems with the Hill-Burton scheme); Hyman, supra note 26, at 810 n.46
(noting reluctance to enforce obligations on hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funding).
138. See Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676,680(10th Cir.
1991) (stating that Congress was concerned about patient "dumping" by private hospitals); see
generally Robert Kuttner, Columbia/HCA and the Resurgence of the For-Profit Hospital
Business, 335 N. ENG. J. MED. 362 & 446 (1996) (two-part report).
139. As an analogy, the federal government could not require supermarkets to provide free
food to every starving person who shows up in the produce department with no money.
Therefore, instead of requiring supermarkets to give away food for free, the government
subsidizes the purchase of food for the indigent with food stamps.
140. See Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights From Behind a Veil of
Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. Rzv. 801, 829 (1998) ("In one sense, compliance with EMTALA is
voluntary, as the law only binds hospitals that receive Medicare funds, but the practicalities of
the health care business require hospitals to participate in Medicare to remain.solvent.")
(citations omitted); see also RICtARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? 89 (1997) ("Because the federal government does not license physicians, it has
to look elsewhere for its power, and ironically it finds its mandate in a robust appeal to the
principle of freedom of contract.").
141. See, e.g., Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1993) ("All court decisions
of which we are aware that have considered takings challenges by physicians to Medicare price
regulations have rejected them in the recognition that participation in Medicare is voluntary.");
Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. III. 1975)
(explaining that providing an economic incentive to participate in a federal program does not
offend the Constitution), affid, 423 U.S. 975 (1975); see also Robert A. Berenson & Dean M.
Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in Traditional Medicare-Should We? Could We? 65 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 162-65 (2002) (describing the limited success of constitutional
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Even critics of EMTALA, such as Richard Epstein, acknowledge that
EMTALA has had some "obvious successes.' ' " Epstein and others, however,
have severely criticized the mandate of EMTALA on the philosophical grounds
of autonomy and freedom of contract, as well as on the practical grounds of
anticipated adverse effects. 4  An unfunded mandate to provide emergency
care may create inefficiencies 46 and may contribute to a reduction in
emergency service capacity or cause undesirable changes in emergency
department operations. 47  Although it is unrealistic to think that we can
challenges to Medicare claims).
142. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes... to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States ....").
143. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (noting that the Court has
repeatedly permitted congressional use of the Spending Clause to "induce government and
private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy"). But cf New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) ("Such conditions must (among other requirements) bear some
relationship to the purpose of the federal spending .. "); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
207-08 & n.3 (1987) (discussing four types of limitations on the spending power, including the
requirement that any condition imposed by Congress be related to the goal of the federal
expenditure). However, the Court did not clarify the extent of relationship between the federal
condition and the federal goal that would be needed to satisfy constitutional requirements. See
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.3 ("Our cases have not required that we define the outer bounds of the
'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on the imposition of conditions under the spending
power."). Andrew McClurg has suggested that EMTALA might violate the constitutional
limitations on the spending power, but has recognized that any such challenge would be
unlikely to succeed. McClurg, supra note 117, at 228-33 (discussing previous failed
constitutional challenges to federal coercion through Congress's use of its spending power).
144. EPSTEIN, supra note 140, at 104.
145. Id. at 84 ("The contrived creation of a binding obligation to provide care is not only
wrong in principle, it is also ineffective in practice, in light of the anticipated response.");
Richard A. Epstein, Living Dangerously: A Defense ofMortal Peril, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 909,
930 (1998) (arguing that private organizations will provide emergency care more effectively if
not burdened by unfunded government mandates); see also Hyman, supra note 117, at 30 ("The
premise of the statute is silly at best; one cannot impose open-ended obligations of this sort on
private parties and expect them to meekly comply-and the inevitable adaptive responses make
everyone worse off."). Other commentators have criticized EMTALA, or at least the prevailing
judicial interpretation of EMTALA, for leading to excessive or inappropriate litigation. See,
e.g., Singer, supra note 117, at 121 (arguing that contrary interpretations of the statute have led
to an increase in litigation and eroded the law's utility); Scaduto, supra note 117, at 945-46
(attributing the increase in litigation to an expansive misinterpretation of EMTALA).
146. See Thomas S. Ulen, Is America's Health Care System in Mortal Peril?: An
Introduction to Mortal Peril, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 690-91 (1998) (discussing "inefficient
strategic behavior" by noncharitable hospitals, indigent patients, and government officials
charged with monitoring and enforcing EMTALA).
147. See Epstein, supra note 145, at 932-33 (discussing how "the hospitals that stay in
business would alter their strategies in ways that are counterproductive in order to minimize the
unfortunate impacts of EMTALA"); Hyman, supra note 117, at 53 (predicting an overall loss of
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eliminate all unfunded mandates and cross-subsidies from the health care
system, we certainly can demand a greater degree of transparency from the
Medicare program in openly acknowledging that costs exist for providing
uncompensated emergency care and that we are forcing community hospitals
and their customers to shoulder those costs. As David Hyman put it, "there are
no free lunches-even in the ED."'
48
In addition, it is important to recognize what EMTALA means for the
nature of the Medicare program. Since the enactment of EMTALA, there is a
clear precedent for using Medicare as a "hook" to require providers to give
away a portion of their goods and services for free. Although Congress enacted
EMTALA as a response to anecdotes and the legislation has significant costs,
additional mandates to provide free goods and services could be proposed in
the future. In light of the history of EMTALA, additional mandates would not
be unthinkable.
B. The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA)
In OBRA of 1990, Congress further amended Section 1866 of the Social
Security Act by enacting the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA).14 9 The
emergency department capacity). But see Henry T. Greely, Richard Epstein's Mortal Peril:
Ebenezer Scrooge Meets the American Health Care System, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 727, 737 &
n.40 (1998) (criticizing Epstein's failure to provide sufficient evidence of the costs and benefits
of EMTALA, as well as Epstein's interpretation of data on the reduction of hospital services).
148. Hyman, supra note 117, at 53.
149. SeeOBRAof1990, Pub. L. No. O-508,§4206,104Stat. 1388,1388-115to-117
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l)(Q), 1395cc(f) (2000)) (amending Section 1566); see
generally Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., The Patient Self-Determination Act and Advance
Directive Completion in Nursing Homes, 7 ARCHIVES OF FAM. MED. 417 (1998) (analyzing the
impact of the PSDA within the nursing home context and determining that it has had a favorable
impact on the documentation of advance directives); Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The
Limits ofAdvance Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act,
32 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 249 (1997) (tracing the history and implementation of the PSDA and
determining that the legislation has been modestly successful in achieving its desired outcome);
Thaddeus M. Pope, The Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the
Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139 (1999)
(examining the effects that the PSDA has had on patient autonomy and arguing that a policy of
informed consent would better preserve this goal of the Act); Jeremy Sugarman et al., The Cost
of Ethics Legislation: A Look at the Patient Self-Determination Act, 3 KENNEDY INST. OF
ETHICS J. 387 (1993) (evaluating the costs and benefits associated with implementing the PSDA
for both health care providers and patients); Joan M. Teno et al., The Impact of the Patient Self-
Determination Act's Requirement that States Describe Law Concerning Patients' Rights, 21
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 102 (1993) (examining the processes used by states in providing to patients




legislation added a new subsection (f) to Section 1866, which sets forth
requirements for Medicare-participating facilities to establish written policies
and procedures on advance directives. " In addition, the PSDA added a new
requirement for Medicare provider agreements to the effect that hospitals and
other health care facilities must agree to comply with the new requirements of
subsection (051
Specifically, facilities are required to maintain policies and procedures to
provide written information to all adult patients about their rights under state
law to refuse treatment and to make advance directives. 52 Hospitals must
provide the written information when the person is admitted as an inpatient. 53
Therefore, the requirements do not apply to outpatients. Health care facilities
are also required to provide information to patients about the facility's policies
on refusal of treatment and advance directives,1 54 to make a notation about the
existence of an advance directive in the patient's medical record, 5' to assure
compliance with state laws on advance directives, 15 6 and to provide or
cooperate in the provision of education on these issues for the facility's staff
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2000) (requiring participants to maintain and provide
written information regarding advance directives for each patient); see also 42 C.F.R.
§§ 489.10(c), 489.100 to .104 (2002) (outlining advance directive requirements for program
participants).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l)(Q) (2000). These requirements apply to provider
agreements with "hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, and hospice
programs." Id. The applicability of Section 1866(0 is somewhat broader, and applies to
Medicare+Choice organizations and certain prepaid or eligible organizations, as well as to
providers. Id. § 1395cc(f(I).
152. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i). The term "advance directive" is defined as a document
authorized by State law with regard to a person who is incapacitated, such as a living will or a
health care power of attorney. Id. § 1395cc(0(3). The federal legislation also requires each
State government to prepare a written description of State statutory and common law with
regard to advance directives. Id. § 1396a(a)(58). See also Larson & Eaton, supra note 149, at
260 (stating that instead of requiring every state to enact an advance directive statute, the bill
requires states to provide written information to patients regarding advance directives); Teno,
supra note 149, at 103-04 (restating the requirements of § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(0(2)(A). Similarly, skilled nursing facilities must provide the
information when the person is admitted as a resident, but home health agencies must provide
the information before the person comes under the agency's care. Id. § 1395cc(f)(2)(B), (C).
154. Id. § 1395cc(f)(l)(A)(ii).
155. Id. § 1395cc(0(I)(B). As originally enacted, the existence of an advance directive had
to be documented "in the individual's medical record." OBRA, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to 1388-117 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(i)(Q), 1395cc(f)
(2000)). Subsequently, Congress amended that provision to specifically require that the
documentation be placed "in a prominent part of the individual's current medical record."
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4641, 111 Stat. 251, 487 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(D) (2000).
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and for the public. 5 7 Finally, health care facilities may not require a patient to
execute an advance directive as a condition of providing care to the patient, nor
may facilities discriminate against a patient who has made the decision to
execute an advance directive.5 8
While the bill was under consideration, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth. 59 In Cruzan,
the Court held that the State of Missouri had not violated Ms. Cruzan's
constitutional rights by requiring clear and convincing evidence of her desires
before permitting termination of artificial nutrition and hydration.' 60 Although
the Court's decision dealt with a fairly narrow constitutional issue, the practical
implication was that federal courts would uphold reasonable state restrictions
on termination of treatment. Therefore, patients who want to avoid being kept
alive on life support would need to execute living wills or other advance
directives in compliance with the requirements of the laws of their state. 6'
Presumably, the federal PSDA would make it easier for patients to avoid
unwanted treatment by requiring health care facilities to establish written
policies and procedures for the use of advance directives and by making
patients aware of their legal options. In fact, the requirements of the PSDA
have been referred to frequently as a type of "Miranda warning.'
6 2
At least officially, the legislation was enacted as a federal effort to
promote patients' rights and to give patients the option to avoid artificial means
of life support. 63 The actions taken by Congress, however, were extremely
157. Id. § 1395cc(f)(l)(E).
158. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(C). Section 4206(c) of OBRA allows the continued application of
any state law that permits a provider to object to the implementation of an advance directive on
the basis of conscience. OBRA § 4206(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc note). See also 42
C.F.R. § 489.102(a)(1)(ii) (2002) (requiring providers to issue a clear and precise written
statement to patients if the provider cannot implement an advance directive on the basis of
conscience); Larson & Eaton, supra note 149, at 255 & n.42 (stating that opposition to the
legislation dissipated when a committee amendment verified state law exceptions for providers
who do not implement advance directives on the basis of conscience). In addition, the Assisted
Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997 (ASFRA) provided a clarification to the Patient Self-
Determination Act (PSDA) to exclude "assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing." 42
U.S.C. § 14406 (2000).
159. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). After the original bill was
introduced on October 17, 1989, the Supreme Court issued its Cruzan decision on June 25,
1990 before the President finally signed the legislation on November 5, 1990. Larson & Eaton,
supra note 149, at 255-56.
160. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280, 282-85.
161. See id. at 280 (upholding the state's imposition of a "procedural safeguard").
162. Pope, supra note 149, at 142 & n.l 1; Larson & Eaton, supra note 149, at 251.
163. Section 4206 of OBRA is entitled "Medicare Provider Agreements Assuring the
Implementation of a Patient's Right to Participate in and Direct Health Care Decisions Affecting
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limited. Congress did not create any federal right to refuse treatment or to
terminate artificial means of life support. Nor did Congress attempt to establish
a uniform, nationwide system of advance directives by means of a preemptive
federal law or by federal funding to states that agree to adopt a model law
meeting federal requirements. Instead, Congress merely required health care
facilities to inform patients of whatever rights they may have under existing
State law.164 This approach has had limited success' 65 and has required health
care facilities to incur additional costs. 1
66
Like EMTALA, the PSDA is an unfunded mandate for providers and is
imposed as a condition of Medicare participation. Like EMTALA, the
requirements are not limited to those who are eligible for benefits under the
Medicare program. In the exigent circumstances of emergency treatment under
EMTALA, it might be inefficient to attempt to distinguish between Medicare
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. There would be no practical impediment,
however, to singling out Medicare beneficiaries for special notice and
recordkeeping requirements as part of the routine paperwork of non-emergency
hospital admission. In fact, Section 1866 imposes a similar notice requirement
that is explicitly limited to Medicare beneficiaries, by requiring hospitals to
agree to provide a notice of rights to each Medicare beneficiary at or near the
time of inpatient admission. 67 There is no practical reason, therefore, that the
the Patient." OBRA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to 1388-
117 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(Q), 1395cc() (2000)). According to Edward Larson
and Thomas Eaton, congressional proponents of the PSDA had six primary goals: 1) "empower
people;" 2) increase the use of advance directives; 3) cause health care providers to comply with
patients' advance directives; 4) promote enactment or clarification of state law; 5) reduce the
futile treatment of dying patients; and 6) reduce health care costs. Larson & Eaton, supra note
149, at 256-62.
164. See BARRY FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW: HORNBOOK SERIES § 16-78 (2d ed. 2000)
("In the late 1980s many members of Congress were looking for a way to join the 'right to die'
bandwagon without having Congress take a substantive position on any of the thorny underlying
issues.").
165. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 149, at 284-85 (reviewing empirical studies). The
authors noted:
Even for the minority of patients who have an advance directive, these documents
often do not appear to influence actual treatment decisions. Moreover, the impact
of advance directives on the level and cost of end-of-life treatment is not clear.
Even under optimal circumstances, potential cost savings appear to be much less
than first suggested by proponents of advance directives.
Id. at 285; see also Pope, supra note 149, at 156-157 ("[T]he PSDA, in spite of its title, not
only fails to assure self-determination, but actually promotes uninformed and under-informed
advance directives.").
166. See Sugarman et al., supra note 149, at 391, 394-95 (estimating the national startup
costs of the PSDA).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(l)(M)(2000). This notice is commonly referred to as the
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additional forms and records required by the PSDA could not be limited to
beneficiaries of the Medicare program.
In the case of the PSDA, there may be more of a connection with the
Medicare program than merely the ability of the government to use Medicare
participation as financial leverage. First, Congress may have recognized that it
would be convenient to use the Medicare law to impose notice and
recordkeeping requirements on health care facilities.1 68 In the legislative
history of the PSDA, Congress noted that although Medicare had no
requirements for advance directives, existing laws that set forth the obligations
of Medicare-participating providers already were in place.' 69 Congress also
noted that, unlike the Medicare statute, the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), through which many hospitals obtain
"deemed status" for Medicare participation, already had a requirement for some
hospital protocols on end-of-life care.' 70 It was reasonable, therefore, to bring
Medicare law up to the level of JCAHO accreditation requirements, although
the PSDA went much further than contemporary JCAHO standards. Finally,
there was some logic to using the Medicare program to promote the use of
advance directives as a way of reducing the program's cost for the care of
terminally ill beneficiaries. At least some advocates of the PSDA considered
cost control to be one of the objectives of the proposed legislation.' Although
the uninsured patients protected by EMTALA are not primarily Medicare
beneficiaries, many-if not most-terminally ill patients are indeed the
elderly and disabled beneficiaries of the program.'73 Thus, there were more
reasons to link the PSDA to the Medicare program than there were with
EMTALA, but even less justification for extending the requirements of the
PSDA to non-Medicare patients.
"Important Message from Medicare."
168. See infra text accompanying note 180 (discussing a study panel of the National
Academy of Social Insurance, which noted that Congress imposes some requirements by means
of the Medicare program because "it is there").
169. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, at 669, 775 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374,
2480.
170. See id. (referring to existing JCAHO requirements for protocols regarding "do not
resuscitate" (DNR) orders).
171. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 149, at 261-62 (referring specifically to Senator
Danforth who was one of the sponsors of the bill). "A legislative goal of less terminal medical
treatment inevitably suggests the aim of reduced health care spending, especially since the
federal government pays for most end-of-life treatment through Medicare." Id. at 261.
172. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the patients that Congress
intended to protect under EMTALA).
173. See Larson & Eaton, supra note 149, at 251 (reporting that Senator Danforth, who
introduced the PSDA, sometime called it a "'Miranda warning' for the terminally ill").
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IV. Using Medicare Funds for the Benefit of the Broader Community
The language and legislative history of the original Medicare Act
demonstrate that, in 1965, Congress intended to assist a specific group of
people and not the community at large. The Act does not contain an explicit
statement of purpose within the statute itself, but it does have introductory
language that sets forth the purposes of the Act, including establishing "a
hospital insurance program for the aged" and "a supplementary medical
benefits program." 74 The Act's introductory language also refers to expanding
the program of medical assistance, improving public assistance programs,
increasing Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits, and
unspecified "other purposes". 175 However, Congress does not mention any
intent to promote broader public goals or assist persons who are not eligible for
benefits under those specific programs. In addition, the legislative history of
the Act indicates that its purpose was "to provide a coordinated approach for
health insurance and medical care for the aged."'1
76
Nevertheless, Congress has permitted the use of Medicare funds to benefit
the broader community by paying more than Medicare's proportional share for
public goals such as medical education and indigent care. 77 In its 1999 report,
the NASI study panel identified three reasons for using the Medicare program
to subsidize these broader social goals. First, Medicare can use its
reimbursement policies to assure the availability of health care providers for its
174. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 286. The
description of the hospital insurance program in Section 1811 of the Act explains the nature of
the insurance program, the type of costs for which coverage is provided, and the limited
category of individuals who are eligible for benefits. Id. § 1811 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c
(2000)). Similarly, the supplementary medical insurance program under Part B that was
established by Section 1831 of the Act is limited by its terms to "individuals 65 years of age or
over who elect to enroll." Id. § 1831 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2000)).
175. Social Security Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. at 286.
176. H.R. REP. No. 89-213, at 2(1965).
177. See NASI , supra note 12, at 39 ("Over the course of its history, Congress has directly
and indirectly mandated that Medicare take on responsibilities beyond providing health
insurance for older individuals and people with disabilities, including subsidizing medical
education and certain 'safety-net' hospitals.") The NASI study panel also referred to these
broader social goals as "public goods," which it defined as "goods or services which are
available to or benefit everyone." Id. at 57. However, economists use a different definition of
"public goods." See infra notes 221-224 and accompanying text (discussing economic meaning
of"public good" and that term's relation to Medicare). Rather than referring to "public goods"
or "social benefits," Michael Gusmano and Mark Schlesinger use the terminology of"collateral"
uses of Medicare, on the ground that some of these activities are not pure public goods, but
merely "localized public goods" or "mixed goods". Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at
43.
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own beneficiaries and to support providers in communities that would be
unable to support the existence of necessary services on their own.17s Second,
Medicare is the national health insurance system in the United States, even
though its benefits are limited to the elderly and disabled. Therefore, the
United States uses its Medicare program to perform functions and accomplish
goals that other nations assign to their national health insurance systems.
79
Third, Congress may have used the Medicare program to accomplish other
public goals simply because "it is there.'
80
A. The Statutory Prohibition Against Cross-Subsidization
Usually, the term "cost shifting" is used to describe a health care
provider's increase in its charges to privately insured patients as a response to
inadequate payment from government payment programs.' 8 ' If the Medicare
program pays more than its "fair share" of a hospital's costs, however, then
Medicare may be subsidizing the care of non-Medicare patients. Under those
circumstances, hospitals might be able to reduce their charges to selected
178. According to a NASI study panel, "because Medicare represents a large portion of all
health care spending, it is also a logical means for influencing the structure of the health care
system .... NASI, supra note 12, at 39.
179. Id.
180. Id. As the report states, "Arguably, it has been relatively easy for Congress to attach
ancillary programs on to Medicare because the program as a whole has been so large and so
popular that legislators and the public will not focus on relatively small 'add-ons."' Id. In their
article, Gusmano and Schlesinger identified some additional reasons that would justify using the
Medicare program to accomplish collateral functions, such as economies of scale, economies of
scope, and "benefit externalities." Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 46. As they
explained, "[m]ost generally, one would want to assign functions to the Medicare program if
they can be done more efficiently or generate larger social benefits than under other institutional
arrangements." Id.
181. See, e.g., David Dranove & William D. White, Medicaid-Dependent Hospitals and
Their Patients: How Have They Fared?, 33 HEALTH SERvs. REs. 163, 165 (1998) ("A provider
'cost-shifts' by raising prices to privately insured patients in response to government
cutbacks."); Jack Zwanziger et al., Can Cost Shifting Continue in a Price Competitive
Environment?, 9 HEALTH EcoN. 211 (2000) (discussing the concern that hospitals may respond
to reductions in both Medicare and Medicaid payments to hospitals by increasing prices for
privately insured patients). But see James F. Blumstein, The Application ofAntitrust Doctrine
to the Healthcare Industry: The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 IND. L.
REv. 91, 114 (1998) ("[T]he ability of hospitals to shift costs assumes the existence of
unexercised market power over at least a segment of the market"); Thomas L. Greaney,
Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. Rv. 1507,
1514 n. 24 (1994) ("Costs, of course, have little to do with what is being shifted. Providers
were engaging in classic economic price discrimination, charging net prices reflecting higher
margins to those with less elastic demand.").
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private payors, such as managed care organizations, and essentially "shift"
some of the costs to the Medicare program.
In the public debate leading up to the enactment of Medicare in 1965,
some health care providers expressed concern that costs would be shifted from
Medicare to private patients. 82 In addition, some Republican members of
Congress argued that the proposed program for the elderly might increase
health care costs for patients under the age of sixty-five, and therefore hospitals
should be paid for treating Medicare patients on the basis of their customary
rates rather than under a formula of reasonable costs. 183 Proponents of the
legislation, however, rebutted those concerns about cost shifting and argued
that the proposed Medicare program would actually make it less necessary for
hospitals to shift the cost of uncompensated care to other patients and third-
party payors.184
To assure that costs would not be shifted from Medicare to other payors,
Congress explicitly required the Secretary in the original 1965 Act to take
indirect as well as direct costs into account in developing a methodology for
182. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 16,110-12 (1965) (discussing a letter from the California
Hospital Association that raised concerns about cost shifting).
183. See H.R. REP. No. 89-213, at 243, 252-53 (1965) (stating separate views of
Republican members in opposition). As those opponents stated:
Any cost which is shifted from the overage 65 patients in the cost formula
prescribed by the Department, must necessarily be paid by someone .... If the
entire burden is shifted from the overage 65 patients to the other patients, this will
inevitably increase hospitalization costs for the patients under age 65.
Id. at 252-53.
184. See S. REP. No. 89-404, at 37 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977-
78. As that report stated:
The committee has given careful consideration to the question of the effect that the
proposed program would have on charges to other paying patients. The insurance
system will reduce the losses of hospital income from bad debts or for care of free
or part-pay aged patients which might otherwise be included in charges to other
paying patients by paying the full cost, except for the deductible and coinsurance,
for substantially all patients over 65 ....
The bill will thus make a contribution toward rationalizing the distribution of
hospital costs and relieving voluntary insurance and prepayment systems, as well as
those patients who pay for services at the time when they are rendered, of some part
of the burden they now bear for indigent and charity patients.
Id. Congress also expressed its intent that the new insurance system for the elderly be self-
supporting and actuarially sound. See H.R. REP. No. 89-213, at 49 (1965) ("Your committee
believes that this program should be completely self-supporting from the contributions of
covered individuals and employers .. "); S. REP. No. 89-404, at 57 (1965). See BARRY
FURROW ET AL., supra note 164, § 11:1 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the prohibition against using
general revenue funds to pay expenses under Part A, although such funds are used for Part B).
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cost reimbursement.' As originally enacted, the hospital insurance program in
Part A paid hospitals the reasonable cost of providing services, subject to
certain exceptions. 186 The Act further provided that the reasonable cost of
those services must be calculated in accordance with regulations to be adopted
by the Secretary. "7 Although Congress gave the Secretary some flexibility in
promulgating those regulations, 81 the Act explicitly required the Secretary to
include the indirect as well as the direct costs of providing those services.189
The purpose of reimbursing providers for their indirect costs was to assure that
"the costs with respect to individuals covered by the insurance programs
established by this title will not be borne by individuals not so covered, and the
costs with respect to individuals not so covered will not be borne by such
insurance programs."19° In that way, Congress prohibited cross-subsidization
185. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861(v)(1), 79 Stat. 286,
322-23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l) (2000)).
186. Id. § 1814(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b) (2000)). As originally enacted, the
insurance program under Part A of Medicare provided "basic protection against the costs of
hospital and related post-hospital services." Id. § 18 11. The current version of that section has
been expanded to include "basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital,
home health services, and hospice care." 42 U.S.C. § 1 395c (2000). In contract, Section 1831
of the Act established a supplementary medical insurance program under Part B. Social
Security Amendments of 1965 § 1831 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2000)).
187. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1861(v)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(v)(l) (2000)). That specific directive to adopt regulations on reasonable cost was in
addition to the general grant of rulemaking authority to the Secretary in Title XVIII. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395hh ("The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the administration of the insurance programs under this subchapter .... ").
188. The Act gave the Secretary flexibility in the following respects:
Such regulations may provide for determination of the costs of services on a per
diem, per unit, per capita, or other basis, may provide for using different methods in
different circumstances, may provide for the use of estimates of costs of particular
items or services, and may provide for the use of charges or a percentage of charges
where this method reasonably reflects the costs.
§ 1861(v)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l) (2000)).
189. Id. The same provision of the Act also required the Secretary to consider the
principles of third-party payment that were generally applied by other organizations. Id. But
see Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1995) (stating that although the
statute requires the Secretary to consider principles adopted by other organizations, the
Secretary is not required to reimburse hospitals in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP)).
190. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 186 l(v)(1)(A), 79 Stat.
286, 323 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A)(i) (2000)); see also S. REP. No. 89-
404, at 36-37 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977 (discussing "reasonable
costs" and how those costs should be borne). In the 1972 amendment to the statute, Congress
replaced the phrase "costs with respect" with "necessary costs of efficiently delivering covered




between the Medicare program and other payors and directed that Medicare
funds should not be used to pay the cost of providing services to non-
beneficiaries.' 9'
Pursuant to this directive, the Secretary adopted a set of regulations that
restated and implemented the statutory prohibition against paying for services
rendered to non-Medicare patients. 192 In general, those regulations provide that
"costs attributable to other patients of the institution are not to be borne by the
program."' 93 For example, the Medicare program refused to reimburse
191. Courts have recognized the statutory prohibition against cross-subsidization and relied
on that prohibition in resolving disputes over Medicare reimbursement. See, e.g., Shalala v.
Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87,97-98 (1995) (recognizing that the Secretary's interpretive
rule requiring amortization of defeasance losses "implements the statutory ban on cross-
subsidization in a reasonable way"); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470-72 (7th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that the Secretary's attempt to remove malpractice costs from the pool of
indirect general and administrative costs was a violation of the statutory prohibition against cost
shifting); St. Luke's Methodist Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765,770 (N.D. Iowa 2001)
("The statute further prohibits Medicare and other payors from 'cross-subsidizing' each
other. ...").
In a creative twist on this line of cases, a patient tried to use the federal statute that
prohibits cost shifting as grounds for a counterclaim in a hospital's action in state court for
payment of its bill. See Methodist Med. Ctr. v. Taylor, 489 N.E. 2d 351, 354 (I1l. App. Ct.
1986) (holding that the federal Medicare statute does not provide a cause of action for a private
pay patient in a hospital's collection action).
192. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 413.9(b)(1) (2000) (restating the statutory definition of
"reasonable cost"); id. § 413.50(b) (stating that principles on apportionment of allowable cost
are designed to carry out the statutory directive); see generally JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE:
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 53-79 (1977) (describing the development of
Medicare reimbursement principles). In light of the number and the extent of current Medicare
regulations, it is interesting to note that there were no regulations in effect when the program
began operation. See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REDUCING MEDICARE COMPLEXITY
AND REGULATORY BURDEN ix (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter REDUCING MEDICARE COMPLEXITY]
("Medicare started in 1966 without any regulations because there was not enough time between
the passage of the act in 1965 and its implementation to write and approve them.") available at
http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional-reports/dec2001 RegBurden.pdf.
193. 42 C.F.R. § 413.5(a); see also id. § 413.50(a)(2) ("The share to be borne by Medicare
is to be determined in accordance with principles relating to apportionment of cost."). As a
practical matter, it was very difficult to apportion each provider's allowable costs between those
attributable to Medicare patients and those attributable to other patients. The Secretary
recognized that Medicare patients are not a representative cross section of a facility's patients,
but rather utilize services in ways that are different from younger patients. Id. § 413.50(c).
Therefore, the proper apportionment of costs is not as simple as merely dividing a facility's total
costs by its percentage of Medicare patients. Id.
For example, under the original 1966 regulations, all of a hospital's indirect general and
administrative (G & A) costs were "pooled," and then the Medicare program would reimburse
the hospital for a percentage of its G & A costs on the basis of that hospital's Medicare patient
utilization ratio. See St. James Hosp., 760 F. 2d at 1463 (explaining how G & A
reimbursements are calculated). Subsequently, the Secretary attempted to remove the cost of
premiums for malpractice insurance from the pool of G & A costs and instead reimburse
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providers for a proportional share of their charity care because allowances for
charity care do not relate to patients who are covered by the Medicare
program.194 Similarly, Medicare does not reimburse providers for the bad debts
that are generated by non-Medicare patients.' 9
B. Subsidizing Costs for Non-Beneficiaries
Despite the statutory prohibition against cross-subsidization and the
regulations designed to enforce that prohibition, the Medicare program does
indeed pay some costs that are attributable to non-Medicare patients. The
Medicare program subsidizes charity care and access to care for non-Medicare
patients, and it subsidizes the training of medical personnel for the good of the
broader community. For example, Medicare provides additional funds to those
hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of indigent patients.'96 In
authorizing exceptions and adjustments for disproportionate share hospitals
(DSH) in the 1983 prospective payment system (PPS), Congress did not
express any intent to use the Medicare program as a means of supporting the
provision of indigent care, but rather emphasized the higher costs incurred by
those hospitals that treat large numbers of indigent patients.' 97 Subsequently,
hospitals for malpractice insurance costs on the basis of loss experience. Id. Ultimately, the
court concluded that the Secretary's malpractice rule violated certain provisions of the Medicare
Act. Id. at 1473.
194. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.80(g) (2002) ("Charity allowances have no relationship to
beneficiaries of the Medicare program and are not allowable costs."); see also § 413.5(c)(7)
("Charity and courtesy allowances are not includable .... "). In addition, the Secretary
characterized charity care as a deduction from revenue as opposed to an allowable cost. Id.
§ 413.80 (a), (c). The regulations also prevented hospitals from shifting to the Medicare
program a portion of the indigent care obligations that they accepted as a condition of grants or
loans under the federal Hill-Burton program. ld. § 413.80(b)(2); see generally St. Mary of
Nazareth Hosp. Ctr. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (7th Cir.
1983).
195. 42 C.F.R. § 413.80 (a), (d). The program will reimburse providers for bad debts
incurred by Medicare beneficiaries who failed to pay their coinsurance or deductible amounts,
because reimbursement for bad debts generated by Medicare beneficiaries is necessary to
prevent costs from being shifted from Medicare patients to non-Medicare patients. Id. The
regulations also provide that the Medicare program will not pay the cost of research, apart from
ordinary patient care. Id. §§ 413.90, 413.5(c)(2).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 412.106 (2002).
197. As stated in the Senate report, "Concern has been expressed that public hospitals and
other hospitals that serve such patients may be more severely ill than average and that the DRG
payment system may not adequately take into account such factors." S. REP. No. 98-23, at 54
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 194. The committee's grammar was somewhat




the DSH adjustment was viewed as a means of assuring the continued existence
of health care facilities to meet the needs of Medicare beneficiaries. 98 In
addition, to assure access to care for Medicare beneficiaries in rural areas, the
program also provides special treatment under PPS for certain categories of
facilities, such as sole community hospitals, rural referral centers, critical access
hospitals, and small rural hospitals that are dependent on Medicare. 99 These
special payment rules not only protect the interests of Medicare beneficiaries,
but also assist health care facilities, local communities, and non-Medicare
beneficiaries.200 Finally, in paying teaching hospitals for graduate medical
education (GME), °' Medicare pays more than the cost of providing medically
necessary care to its beneficiaries and more than the actual costs incurred by
teaching hospitals in educating their medical residents.20 2
198. See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 78 (Mar.
2001) (considering financial issues and implications of Medicare), available at http://www.
medpac.gov/publications/congressionalreports/Mar01%20Table%20of%20Contents.pdf. The
report stated:
The original justification for the DSH adjustment presumed that poor patients are
more costly to treat, but ProPAC [the Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission] adopted an alternative objective that had evolved over time: to
protect access to care for Medicare beneficiaries, additional funds should be
provided to hospitals whose viability might be threatened by providing care to the
poor. Although the financial pressure from treating low-income patients can
include any extra costs incurred, the primary threats are underpayment or
nonpayment.
Id. The DSH adjustment formula is not based solely on a facility's treatment of low-inucome
Medicare beneficiaries, but also includes consideration of a facility's percentage of Medicaid
patient days. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F) (2000). In fact, the formula is designed in part to
provide greater assistance to those hospitals, such as inner city public hospitals, that have very
high percentages of uncompensated care and very low percentages of Medicare patients.
MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE IN RURAL AMERICA 81-82 (June 2001)
[hereinafter MEDICARE IN RURAL AMERICA], available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications
congressional-reports/JunO I %20Table%20of/o20Contents.pdf. Ironically, the Medicare
program is promoting access for Medicare beneficiaries by providing greater financial support
to those facilities that treat the lowest percentages of Medicare beneficiaries.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(C), (D), (G) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 412.90 (2002); see also
MEDICARE IN RURAL AMERICA, supra note 198, at 58-59 ("These policies are intended to
support rural hospitals that are important or solitary sources of medical services for Medicare
beneficiaries.").
200. See MEDICARE IN RURAL AMERICA, supra note 198, at 59 (recognizing that these
special Medicare payment programs "provide financial protection to hospitals" and "an adequate
financial base for facilities in rural areas").
201. See generally John K. Iglehart, Medicare and Graduate Medical Education, 338 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 402 (1998).
202. See infra notes 205-31 and accompanying text (analyzing Medicare's effect on
graduate medical education).
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In the original 1965 Medicare legislation,2 °3 Congress did not explicitly
address the issue of reimbursement for a teaching hospital's education costs.
That issue was subsumed in Congress's general directive to the Secretary to
adopt regulations for reimbursement of a hospital's reasonable costs. 20 4 The
legislative history, however, includes a statement of congressional intent that
the Medicare program should pay an "appropriate" share of a teaching
hospital's education costs as one part of the cost of patient care.20 5 Congress
recognized that medical education and residency programs improve a hospital's
quality of care, and that there is a need to support those activities "until the
community undertakes to bear such education costs in some other way.
20 6
Therefore, Congress indicated that a "part" of those education costs should be
paid by the Medicare program "to an appropriate extent. 20 7 For many years,
this one ambiguous sentence in the legislative history was the only evidence of
congressional intent to pay for GME costs as part of the cost for treatment of
Medicare patients.208
203. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286.
204. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional directive).
205. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 36 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977. The
authors of the report argued:
Educational activities enhance the quality of care in an institution, and it is
intended, until the community undertakes to bear such education costs in some
other way, that a part of the net cost of such activities (including stipends of
trainees as well as compensation of teachers and other costs) should be considered
as an element in the cost of patient care, to be borne to an appropriate extent by the
hospital insurance program.
Id. An identical statement appears in the House Report on the 1965 Medicare legislation. H.R.
REP. No. 89-213, at 32 (1965).
206. H.R. REP. No. 89-213, at 32. In contrast to education expenses, the Senate Report
notes that there is no need for Medicare to bear the costs of medical research, because other
funds are available for that purpose. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 36.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., St. John's Hickey Mem. Hosp. v. Califano, 599 F.2d 803, 808 & n.7 (7th
Cir. 1979) ("The legislative history of the Medicare Act clearly shows that the Medicare
Program was intended to pay its share of a hospital's cost of educational activities contributing
to patient care until such costs are borne by the community served by the hospital."); see also
Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) ("'Appropriate' is
one of the most wonderful weasel words in the dictionary, and a great aid to the resolution of
disputed issues in the drafting of legislation."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-
94-33, MEDICARE: GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION PAYMENT POLICY NEED TO BE REEXAMINED
7 & n. 13 (1994) [hereinafter GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION] ("The committee reports
indicated that these educational activities enhance the quality of care in an institution and that
Medicare should recognize these costs for reimbursement purposes until communities undertake
to bear such costs in another manner."), available at http://www.gao.gov/index.htm]. Compare
Bryant v. Riddle Mem. Hosp., 689 F. Supp. 490, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("Statements in a
congressional committee report recommending adoption of legislation are highly authoritative in
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When initial Medicare regulations were adopted in 1966, the Secretary
paraphrased and expanded on the concepts set forth in the legislative history.2 °9
In addition to recognizing the positive contribution of education to a hospital's
quality of care, the Secretary explained that education programs "are necessary
to meet the community's needs for medical and paramedical personnel.
21
Moreover, the rule went further than the legislative history by explicitly
acknowledging that education expenses ought to be paid by the broader
community, and that many communities have failed to meet their
responsibilities in this regard.21 Therefore, as one of the purchasers of health
care services, Medicare would "participate appropriately in the support of these
activities.
'4 2
In the early 1980s, the Medicare program addressed the issue of education
expenses in making exceptions to the cost limits that were used at that time and
in developing adjustments to the new system of prospective payment.
2 3
determining the purpose of that legislation.") with Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia,
91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996) ( "We must be mindful, on the other hand, that it is the
statute, and not a committee report, that is signed by the President and has therefore become
law.").
209. 42 C.F.R. § 413.85 (1993). As that regulation sets forth:
These programs contribute to the quality of patient care within an institution and
are necessary to meet the community's needs for medical and paramedical
personnel. It is recognized that the costs of such educational activities should be
borne by the community. However, many communities have not assumed
responsibility for financing these programs and it is necessary that support be
provided by those purchasing health care. Until communities undertake to bear
these costs, the program will participate appropriately in the support of these
activities.
Id. Originally, that rule was codified as 20 C.F.R. § 405.421 (1967), and was later recodified as
42 C.F.R. § 405.421 (1977), and then as 42 C.F.R. § 413.85 (1993). Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 507 & n.I (1994).
210. 42 C.F.R. § 405.421 (1977).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Joseph P. Newhouse & Gail R. Wilensky, Paying for Graduate Medical
Education: The Debate Goes On, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 136, 138 (noting that
Congress felt it necessary to decide "whether and how to account for teaching hospitals' higher
costs"); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-33, MEDICARE: INDIRECT MEDICAL
EDUCATION PAYMENTS ARE Too HIGH 12 (1989) [hereinafter INDIRECT MEDICAL EDUCATION]
("HCFA first made allowances for the indirect costs of medical education in 1980 by increasing
for teaching hospitals the 'section 223' cost limits in effect at that time."), available at
http://www.gao.gov/index.html.
In providing adjustments for education costs under PPS, Congress emphasized the higher
costs incurred by teaching hospitals and noted that Medicare has historically considered GME
expenses to be "worthy of support." S. REP. No. 98-23, at 1 (1983), reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 192. As that report set forth:
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Congress distinguished between direct costs of GME, including compensation
of residents and faculty, and indirect costs of GME, which were the higher
costs incurred by teaching hospitals for other reasons. 214 Under PPS, Medicare
pays direct GME (DME) costs on the basis of an amount per resident,2" but
pays indirect GME (IME) costs by adjusting PPS payments on the basis of each
hospital's intern-to-bed ratio.216 On the basis of its statistical analysis, HCFA
recommended a specific formula for increasing Medicare payments to teaching
hospitals for their IME costs. 217 Because that formula would have worked to
the disadvantage of teaching hospitals, Congress doubled the adjustment factor
for determining the amount by which IME costs would increase Medicare
payments to teaching hospitals. 218 At this point, it is beyond dispute that the
Medicare program overpays teaching hospitals for their education expenses.219
Moreover, as discussed below, the Medicare program really is subsidizing other
functions of teaching hospitals, such as indigent care.220
This adjustment is provided in the light of doubts (explicitly acknowledged by the
Secretary in his recent report to the Congress on prospective payment) about the
ability of the DRG case classification system to account fully for factors such as
severity of illness of patients requiring the specialized services and treatment
programs provided by teaching institutions and the additional costs associated with
the teaching of residents.
Id. at 192; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-25, at 80 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 359
(same).
214. See Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 138 ("The costs were presumed higher
because teaching hospitals offered a broader array of technically sophisticated services and saw
sicker patients whose resource needs were not fully captured by the PPS, but the source of the
higher costs remains murky."); see also INDIRECT MEDICAL EDUCATION, supra note 213, at 2, 11
(distinguishing between direct and indirect costs of GME).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.1(a), 413.86 (2002).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(B) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 412.105 (2002). See generally
INDIRECT MEDICAL EDUCATION, supra note 213, at 2-3, 11.
217. See Sean Nicholson & David Song, The Incentive Effects of the Medicare Indirect
Medical Education Policy, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 909, 912 (2001) ("Based on the teaching
intensity regression coefficient, HCFA recommended that a hospital's Medicare price increase
by 5.8 percent for every 0.10 increase in its resident to bed ratio.").
218. Id. at 912-13; INDIRECT MEDICAL EDUCATION, supra note 213, at 13.
219. See Kathleen Dalton et al., A Longitudinal Study ofthe Effects of Graduate Medical
Education on Hospital Operating Costs, 35 HEALTH SERvs. REs. 1267,1268 (2001) ("Evidence
that the IME formulas overcompensate for cost differentials has been documented
repeatedly .. "); see also GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, supra note 208, at 8 & n.18
(noting that GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, HHS, and the Prospective Payment
Assessment Commission all concluded that Medicare's IME payments were excessive).
220. See GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION, supra note 208, at 8 & n. 18 (discussing the use
and levels of various types of Medicare payments). The GAO report stated:
While indirect medical education (IME) payments were intended to compensate
hospitals for higher costs attributable to the involvement of interns and residents in
1294
BEYOND BENEFICIARIES
Representatives of teaching hospitals insist that Medicare, as well as all
other payors, should pay for GME as a public good, because having a highly
trained workforce is a benefit to society as a whole. 22' But in economic terms, a
public good is not merely something that is good for the public; rather, it is a
good from which no member of the public can be excluded.222 As others have
pointed out, GME is not really a public good in economic terms because some
individuals do not have access to the services of physicians.223 GME produces
"human capital" that the physician owns and, therefore, it is a private good with
a positive externality in the sense that it is likely to provide benefits to people
other than the physician.224
Moreover, teaching hospitals do not really pay the cost of GME because
the residents themselves pay those costs in the form of reduced wages for their
services.225 The Medicare program is either paying teaching hospitals for costs
they do not really incur 226 or, alternatively, Medicare is really paying for
something other than education costs. 227 The economic analysis supports the
patient care, they are also used to compensate teaching hospitals for the higher
costs associated with their urban location, treating more severely ill patients, and
treating a disproportionate share of low-income patients.
Id. at 8. In addition, GAO took the position that it is not appropriate to pay for charity care by
means of IME adjustments. Id. at n.18.
221. Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 139; Adepeju L. Gbadebo and Uwe L.
Reinhardt, Economists on Academic Medicine: Elephants in a Porcelain Shop?, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2001, at 148, 150. The Council on Graduate Medical Education (COGME) has
proposed a system of all-payor financing for the costs of GME. See David N. Sundwall,
AnotherAlternativefor Financing Graduate Medical Education: A Proposalfrom the Council
on Graduate Medical Education, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 156, 157 (setting forth
proposal).
222. Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 140,146 n.4; Gbadebo & Reinhardt, supra
note 221, at 150. Because no one can be excluded from a public good, individuals have an
incentive to freeload rather than pay for it, and it is necessary to support production of the good
by mandatory taxation. Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 140.
223. Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 146 n.4.
224. Gbadebo & Reinhardt, supra note 221, at 150. In their policy analysis, Gusmano and
Schlesinger characterize Medicare's payments for GME as a "mixed" good that helps
beneficiaries and also generates positive externalities, but they do not consider medical
education to be a public good. Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 43-44, 68.
225. Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 140-41; see Nicholson & Song, supra note
217, at 913 ("According to human capital theory, residents should pay for training costs (direct
and indirect) by accepting a wage below their marginal revenue product.").
226. See Nicholson & Song, supra note 217, at 913 ("Therefore, IME payments are
redundant: hospitals are reimbursed for training costs once by residents and a second time by
the government.").
227. Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 140 ("[The costs Medicare was and is
reimbursing are not education costs at all.").
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conclusion that GME payments are really subsidies for charity care and other
nonteaching functions of academic medical centers. This conclusion does not
necessarily mean that Medicare should stop providing the subsidies, but merely
that Congress must justify the subsidies, if at all, on very different grounds
from the education of new physicians.228
Recent analyses of GME costs have dealt primarily with statistical issues,
such as IME formulas that pay teaching hospitals more than their actual costs,
and issues of economic theory, such as whether Medicare is really paying for
education or is actually paying for other types of expenses incurred by teaching
hospitals. But a separate and more fundamental issue is: Should the Medicare
program pay teaching hospitals for any costs that exceed what it would cost the
program to purchase the same or similar service for a beneficiary at an ordinary,
nonteaching hospital?
By agreeing to pay for education expenses at teaching hospitals, the
Medicare program expanded its purpose beyond merely paying the cost of
providing health care services to eligible beneficiaries. The Secretary
recognized that education expenses are really an obligation of the community
and not of the Medicare program or any other purchasers. Medicare only pays
a share of those education costs, 229 but that does not change the fact that
Medicare has assumed an obligation to the community to pay for something
other than providing health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Although
the legislative history refers to education costs "as an element in the cost of
patient care, 230 in reality Medicare is paying for something other than the
actual cost of providing medically necessary care, regardless of whether those
228. Gbadebo and Reinhardt suggest that, despite economic theory, it is morally right to
provide financial support for the safety net role that academic medical centers have been forced
to play in the United States and in no other country. Gbadebo & Reinhardt, supra note 221, at
152; see also Nicholson & Song, supra note 217, at 913 (recognizing that IME payments may
be justifiable on other grounds such as supporting charity care and medical research). In
addition, some experts have argued that the Medicare program could use its financial support of
teaching hospitals as a means to influence the distribution of physicians among particular
specialties. See, e.g., Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 68-70 (discussing the possible
effects in specialization of changes in DME payments); Newhouse and Wilensky, supra note
213, at 140, 146 ("Many of those advocating federal support [for GME] appear to want to use
that support to shape the total number of residents and their distribution among specialties.").
229. In fact, Medicare pays more than its allocable share of education costs because other
third-party payors, such as managed care organizations, do not pay their allocable share. See
Ralph W. Muller et al., Does Economic Theory Justify Changing Policy That Works?, HEALTH
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 153, 155 ("[T]he fundamental flaw.., lies in the current and potential
future failure of many private payors in an increasingly price-competitive marketplace to pay
their fair share of the costs ....").
230. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 36 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977.
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costs are really attributable to education of physicians, charity care, or medical
research.
Teaching hospitals argue that they have higher costs for providing patient
care to Medicare beneficiaries. However, that argument begs the question of
whether the Medicare program should pay a teaching hospital any more than it
would pay a nonteaching hospital to provide the same or a similar health care
service. To the extent that teaching hospitals have higher direct and indirect
costs, those elevated expenses are really the costs of teaching or other functions
of the teaching hospital, and not the actual costs of providing medically
necessary care to Medicare beneficiaries. Rather than admitting that they are
paying for something else, however, Congress and the Secretary persist in
attempting to justify the subsidy to teaching hospitals as reimbursement for the
hospitals' higher costs of providing covered health care services. In
considering alternative justifications for the Medicare program to subsidize
academic medical centers, we should strive for greater transparency by
admitting openly that the purposes of Medicare include providing support for
indigent care, medical research, and the infrastructure of public and private
health care facilities.231
C. Judicial Recognition that Medicare Promotes Broader Public Goals
In addition to considering the views of beneficiaries and policy elites with
regard to using Medicare to accomplish broader goals,232 it also is useful to
consider the views of courts with regard to the nature and purposes of the
Medicare program. Furthermore, one must analyze how the views of courts on
those issues have evolved over time. Courts can serve as a barometer of
contemporary views about an important public program and also as a catalyst to
change the views of policymakers and the broader community.
Like the Social Security program, the Medicare program is an exercise of
the power of Congress under the Spending Clause.33 In describing the Social
Security program, the Supreme Court explained that Congress used its
spending power to enact "a form of social insurance. 2 34 The Court reasoned
231. See REDUCING MEDICARE COMPLEXITY, supra note 192, at 9,23 (acknowledging that
supporting medical education, facilities for indigent care, and rural access are additional goals of
the Medicare program).
232. See Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 49-58 (describing the results of
telephone interviews, focus groups, and literature review).
233. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing the use and limitations of
the Spending Clause).
234. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609 (1960).
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that the interest of a Social Security beneficiary is a "noncontractual benefit
under a social welfare program" '235 and is not subject to the concept of"accrued
property rights."2 36 Like Social Security, the Medicare program is a tax-
supported social welfare program as well as a system of insurance. At least
implcitly, the Supreme Court has recognized this dual, or schizophrenic, nature
of Medicare in describing Part A as "insurance" and Part B as a "social
program.
237
Over the years, courts have had the opportunity to consider the nature and
purposes of the Medicare program. Until recently, almost all courts have
found-or at least have assumed-that Congress enacted the Medicare program
solely as a way to assist its elderly and disabled beneficiaries.238 For example,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the intent of Congress in creating the Medicare
program was solely to pay hospitals for the cost of treating qualified Medicare
beneficiaries. 239  Congress enacted the Hill-Burton Act 240 to assist in
construction and improvement of hospitals, whereas the Medicare statute "was
adopted only to provide medical care for the disabled and the aged who qualify
as Medicare beneficiaries. 24 Other courts have considered the limited purpose
of Medicare in concluding that health care facilities and practitioners have no
property interest in continued Medicare participation because they are not the
235. Id. at 611. As the Court explained, "It is apparent that the noncontractual interest of
an employee covered by the Act cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an
annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual premium payments." Id. at 610.
236. Id. at 610 ("To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of 'accrued property
rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing
conditions which it demands." (quoting Elmer F. Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social-Security
Benefits, 37 OR. L. REv. 299,359 (1958))). See also U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
174 (1980) (stating that social security benefits and railroad retirement benefits may be changed
or eliminated because they are not contractual).
237. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 189-90 (1982). As the court stated, "Part B
consequently resembles a private medical insurance program that is subsidized in major part by
the Federal Government." Id. at 190; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
506 (1994) ("Medicare is a federally funded health insurance program for the elderly and
disabled.").
238. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402,404 (1993) ("As a means of
providing health care to the aged and disabled, Congress enacted the Medicare program in
1965."); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 775 n.2 (1980) (noting that
Medicare "is primarily for the benefit of the aged and disabled," whereas Medicaid "is primarily
designed for the poor"); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 1973) ("This is
an Act of 1965 to protect individuals 65 years of age and over from the high cost and the
hardship of illness.").
239. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.2d 1337,
1342-(7th Cir. 1983).
240. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (2000).
241. St. Mary of Nazareth, 698 F.2d at 1343.
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intended beneficiaries of the program.2 42  For example, in holding that a
physician did not have a protected property interest, the First Circuit observed
that "[t]he Medicare Part B program is nothing more than a governmental
insurance program for the aged.
243
In 2000, however, the Supreme Court made a major change from the
traditional view of the Medicare program in Fischer v. United States2" by
concluding that Medicare is "aimed at ensuring the availability of health care
for the broader community. 2 45 Fischer was an appeal of a federal criminal
conviction for, among other things, bribing an agent of an organization that had
received benefits under a program of federal assistance.246 As part owner and
president of a corporation known as Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. (QMC),
Jeffrey Fischer obtained a loan for QMC of $1.2 million from the West Volusia
Hospital Authority (WVHA), a municipal hospital authority that operated two
Medicare-participating hospitals. 247 Fischer negotiated the loan with Robert
Caddick, WVHA's chief financial officer, who asked Fischer for a loan of
$10,000 from QMC. 24a Subsequently, QMC gave $10,000 in "consulting fees"
to Caddick's mother, who had never performed services of any kind for QMC,
and then she turned the money over to Caddick in accordance with his
instructions.249
242. See, e.g., Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 864 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Dr. Koerpel is not
the intended beneficiary of the Medicare program .... ").
243. Cervoni v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 1010, 1018 (1st Cir. 1978).
Although a few courts have held or assumed that providers have a property interest in continued
program participation, those decisions were not necessarily based on an analysis of the
underlying purposes of the Medicare program. See Erickson v. United States, 67 F.3d 858, 862
(9th Cir. 1995) (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that a provider has a property
interest, on the ground that the Fourth Circuit had inappropriately relied on a prior case
involving the Medicaid program and state administrative regulations for peer review).
244. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
245. Id. at 680.
246. See id. at 670 (describing the indictments).
247. Id. at 669-70. As a public agency subject to legal restrictions on investment of its
assets, WVHA had no authority to loan money to a private corporation such as QMC. United
States v. Fischer, 168 F.3d 1273, 1274 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1999), affd, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
Moreover, Fischer had defrauded WVHA by pledging QMC's accounts receivable as security
for the loan, even though they were already pledged to a different creditor, and by giving
WVHA an illegitimate letter of credit. Id. at 1274. QMC was unable to repay the loan, and a
draft from the bank that had issued the illegitimate letter of credit was not honored. Id. at 1275.
In an unrelated matter, Fischer had been convicted several years earlier on three counts of mail
fraud. Id. at 1275 n.5.
248. Fischer, 168 F.3d at 1274-75.
249. Id. at 1275.
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Among other counts, Fischer was indicted and convicted for paying a
bribe or kickback to an agent of an organization that receives benefits as part of
a federal assistance program, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)." ° The
conviction was predicated on the fact that WVHA had received more than
$10,000 per year in payments from the Medicare program, and in fact WVHA
had received at least $10 million from Medicare in 1993.5 On appeal, Fischer
argued that even though WVHA had received more than $10,000 in payments
under a federal assistance program, WHVA had not received "benefits" under
that federal program.25 2 In rejecting Fischer's argument and affirming his
convictions,253 the Eleventh Circuit explicitly disagreed with the district court's
analysis in United States v. LaHue,254 which held that Medicare Part B funds
were not "benefits" within the meaning of § 666.255 A few weeks after the
Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in Fischer, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision in LaHue.256 On November 1, 1999, the Supreme
Court granted the writ of certiorari in Fischer, apparently to resolve the circuit
250. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667,670 (2000). In pertinent part, § 666 provides
as follows:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section
exists ....
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person,
with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving anything of value of S 5,000 or more; shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the
organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in
excess of $ 10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy,
loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.
(c) This section does not apply to bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other
compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.
18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
251. Fischer, 529 U.S. at 670.
252. Id. at 670, 676. There was no dispute that Medicare is a federal assistance program,
nor was there any dispute that WVHA had received more than $10,000 per year in payments
under that program. See id. at 676 ("The sole point in contention is whether those payments
constituted 'benefits,' within the meaning of subsection (b).") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666)).
253. United States v. Fischer, 168 F.3d 1273, 1277-78 (11 th Cir. 1999).
254. United States v. LaHue, 998 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Kan. 1998), affd, 170 F.3d 1026
(10th Cir. 1999).
255. Id. at 1192 (concluding that those funds are not properly considered in determining
how much federal funding an organization receives).
256. United States v. LaHue, 170 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1999).
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split on that issue.257 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, which six other
Justices joined, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eleventh
Circuit and held that participating hospitals receive benefits from the Medicare
program and not merely compensation for services rendered.25 8
The specific issues before the Supreme Court in Fischer were whether the
payments that hospitals receive from Medicare constitute "benefits" within the
meaning of subsection (b) of § 666, and whether Congress excluded those
payments from coverage of the statute under subsection (c) as mere
compensation or reimbursement for services rendered in the ordinary course of
business.2 59 To reach its decision, the Court undertook a comprehensive
analysis of the nature and purposes of the Medicare program, including its
regulatory structure, reimbursement system, and goals. 260 First, the Court
reviewed the extensive regulation of participating providers under Medicare
statutes and rules261 and noted that providers obtain important advantages by
262th Cormeeting the program's conditions of participation. Second, the Court
undertook a detailed review of the system of cost reimbursement and
recognized that Medicare pays for the cost of broader social goals such as
supporting graduate medical education and disproportionate share hospitals.
2 63
257. Fischer v. United States, 528 U.S. 962 (1999). As stated in the Court's subsequent
opinion on the merits in that case, "[w]e granted certiorari to determine whether the statute
covers fraud perpetrated on organizations participating in the Medicare program." Fischer v.
United States, 529 U.S. 667, 669 (2000).
258. Fischer, 529 U.S. at 669, 679. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
259. See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 670 (2000) (describing the issues).
260. Id. at 671-75. One of the most interesting aspects of the Court's analysis is what it
did not do. The Court did not accept the Government's suggestion to rely on the cases and
regulations that treat Medicare payments as federal financial assistance to the hospital for
purposes of civil rights and antidiscrimination laws. See Brief for the United States at 13, 28-
30, Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000) (No. 99-116). Among other theories, the
government argued that Medicare-participating hospitals should be considered to be recipients
of benefits under § 666 because hospitals are considered to be recipients of federal financial
assistance for purposes of anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 30. The Government cited United
States v. Baylor University Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984) and the Secretary's
long-standing administrative interpretation to that effect. Id. However, the Fischer Court did
not even mention that argument and instead undertook its own analysis on the basis of the
nature and purposes of the Medicare program.
261. Fischer, 529 U.S. at 672.
262. Id. at 678.
263. Id. at 673-74. The Court stated: "Allowable costs include amounts which enhance
the organization's capacity to provide ongoing, quality services not only to eligible patients but
also to the community at large." Id. at 673. The Court also quoted from the Medicare
reimbursement rule at 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c), which recognizes the need for the Medicare
program to "participate appropriately" in supporting activities such as medical education, until
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The Court also identified other ways in which the reimbursement system is
designed to assist providers, including the use of periodic interim payments
(PIP) to assist providers in maintaining their cash flow and the use of incentives
for creating funded depreciation accounts.264 Although the Court recognized
that elderly and disabled individuals are the primary beneficiaries of the
program,265 the Court concluded that health care providers also receive benefits
under the program.
66
In addition to concluding that providers receive benefits from their
participation in the program, the Court determined that providers are not merely
receiving compensation for services rendered in the ordinary course of
business.267 The Court distinguished Medicare providers from mere contractors
that the government does not assist or regulate for long-term goals. 268 In
contrast, the Court reasoned that the purposes of the Medicare program include
assisting providers and assuring the availability of health care facilities for the
good of the community. 269 The Court occasionally referred to the need to
preserve a system of health care for elderly and disabled beneficiaries of the
communities assume their own responsibility for those costs. Fischer, 529 U.S. at 673.
Although the Fischer court analyzed the system of cost reimbursement, its conclusions
would generally apply as well under the current prospective payment system (PPS). Under the
current system, Medicare still provides financial support for graduate medical education and
disproportionate share hospitals, both of which were factors noted by the Fischer court. See,
e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(0 (2002) (noting that Medicare permits additional payments for specific
costs); id. § 412.90 (stipulating that certain types of hospitals, such as sole community hospitals,
receive special treatment under PPS); see also Fischer, 529 U.S. at 685 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(explaining that PPS "is also designed to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing care to
Medicare beneficiaries").
264. Fischer, 529 U.S. at 673-74.
265. Id. at 677.
266. See id. ("That one beneficiary of an assistance program can be identified does not
foreclose the existence of others, however.").
267. See id. at 679 ("The payments are made for significant and substantial reasons in
addition to compensation or reimbursement, so that neither these terms nor the usual course of
business conditions set forth in subsection (c) are met here.").
268. Id. at 680. The Court emphasized that its reasoning would not subject all federal
contractors, or even all federal assistance programs, to the coverage of the fraud or bribery
penalties of§ 666. Rather, it would be necessary to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
an organization actually received "benefits" under the federal program in which it participates.
id. at 680-81. But, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that the majority's
reasoning would apply inappropriately to other organizations that participate in federal
assistance programs, such as grocery stores that accept food stamps. Id. at 691-93 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
269. See id. at 679-80 ("Adequate payment and assistance to the health care provider is
itself one of the objectives of the program.").
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program,270 but the Court also wrote more expansively of Medicare's role in
ensuring the availability of high quality facilities for "the greater
community.127 1 As the Court observed, "[t]he structure and operation of the
Medicare program reveal a comprehensive federal assistance enterprise aimed
at ensuring the availability of quality health care for the broader community.
2 72
V. Potential Uses of the Medicare Program to Accomplish Other Policy
Goals
Together with the judicial recognition of the program's broader purposes,
the current functions of Medicare provide a basis for considering other potential
uses of the program. Gusmano and Schlesinger have suggested that Congress
could use the Medicare program to promote the health status of beneficiaries
through environmental and social interventions, as opposed to merely paying
for treatment of their illnesses and injuries, and could provide health education
to young people as well as to beneficiaries.273 In addition, William Sage and
Peter Hammer have suggested that the Medicare program, as a major buyer of
health care services, could take a more active role in the antitrust arena by
responding to proposed mergers or acquisitions of health care providers.274
270. See, e.g., id. at 680 ("[Tlhe government receives long-term advantages from the
existence of a sound and effective health care system for the elderly and disabled."). As the
Court stated, "This scheme is structured to ensure that providers possess the capacity to render,
on an ongoing basis, medical care to the program's qualifying patients." Id.
271. See id. at 679-80 (explaining that Congress makes Medicare payments in part to
maintain quality medical care for the benefit of the community).
272. Id. at 680; cf United States v. Soileau, 309 F.3d 877, 882 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Medicare is not a "financial institution" for the purpose of sentence enhancement under the
federal sentencing guidelines).
273. Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 60-63. They correctly point out that "most
of the behaviors that have health consequences in old age are established much earlier in life."
Id. at 63. In that sense, every individual who is not yet eligible for Medicare could be viewed as
a "pre-beneficiary." Under current law, the Secretary has statutory authority to provide
education and assistance to eligible beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-3 (2000). In addition,
with. regard to Medigap insurance, the Secretary has statutory authority to provide information
to individuals who are entitled to Medicare benefits as well as to "individuals about to become
so entitled." 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(e) (2000).
274. See William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need
to Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1069,
1117 (1999) ("Although HCFA is the largest purchaser of physician and hospital services
nationally, and plays a growing role in managed care, it does not currently take positions on
health care competition or communicate views on particular practices or transactions to DOJ
and FTC."). The Department of Defense (DOD) may provide a useful model for a more active
role by the federal government as a large-scale buyer in protecting the competitive market. As
the primary or sole buyer of military aircraft, DOD actively participated with the Department of
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Two additional ways in which Congress might use Medicare to accomplish
broader public goals are considered below. The first is the possible use of
Medicare participation to promote compliance with other types of laws, such as
labor and environmental regulations. The second is the further use of Medicare
as a hook to promote even broader access to care.
A. The Potential Use of Medicare to Promote Compliance with Other Types
of Laws
Although Medicare-participating providers must meet a variety of
requirements that relate to their dealings with patients and the program, the
Medicare program does not purport to regulate other areas of providers'
activities, such as their labor and employment practices. Under current law,
Congress may exclude health care providers from participation in Medicare for
specified conduct, including certain criminal convictions that relate to patient
care, financial integrity, and substance abuse. Medicare law, however, does not
provide that any violation of an unrelated statute or regulation will be a basis
for exclusion from the program.
In the analogous context of government procurement, the federal
government proposed and ultimately rejected a plan to disqualify federal
contractors who violated other types of laws, such as labor and environmental
laws. Although that particular proposal did not apply to the Medicare program,
it raises the interesting question of whether the program ought to exclude from
participation any provider or supplier who violates other types of laws as a way
to promote compliance with other specific laws. Put another way, should
Congress amend the Medicare statute to provide that a violation of other types
of laws is a basis for termination of a provider agreement or exclusion from
participation in the Medicare program?
The Medicare statute and regulations already incorporate some obligations
that are set forth in other legal authorities, such as applicable state laws. For
example, the definition of "hospital" in the Medicare statute includes a
requirement to meet the licensure standards of the relevant state or local
hospital licensing agency.275 Similarly, the conditions of participation for
Justice in challenging the proposed merger of defense contractors Lockheed Martin and
Northrup Grumman. Joel I. Klein, Statement on the Abandonment of the Lockheed Northrop
Transaction (July 16, 1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/i998/July/334.html (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
275. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1861 (e), 79 Stat. 286,
314-15 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l) (2000)) (setting forth requirements that an
institution must meet to qualify as a hospital for the purposes of this law). The statute reads, in
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hospitals include a requirement to comply "with applicable Federal laws related
to the health and safety of patients." 276 The purpose of incorporating the
requirements of those federal, state, and local laws is to protect the interests of
beneficiaries and other patients, and not to use the Medicare program as a way
to promote compliance with laws that are unrelated to the welfare of patients.
In a similar manner, the grounds for termination of a provider agreement
and exclusion from Medicare all arguably relate to the interests of patients or
the Medicare program, and are not merely ways to encourage compliance with
other types of laws. Under Title XVIII, only four grounds exist on which the
Secretary may refuse to enter into a provider agreement, refuse to renew an
agreement, or terminate an agreement.277 These four statutory grounds for
termination are: (1) the provider's failure to substantially comply with the
provider agreement, Title XVIII and Medicare regulations, or a required
corrective action; (2) the provider's substantial failure to meet the requirements
set forth in the definitional section of the Medicare statute; (3) the exclusion of
the provider from the program under specified sections of the statute; and
(4) the provider's conviction of a felony for an offense that is harmful to the
Medicare program and its beneficiaries. 78
Aside from terminating a provider agreement, the statutes set forth
grounds for exclusion from participation in Medicare and other federally
supported health care programs.2 79  The grounds for exclusion from
participation are more detailed than the grounds for termination of a provider
agreement, but again the grounds for exclusion relate to the interests of patients
and the program, rather than an effort to use Medicare as a way to promote
compliance with other laws. Certain criminal convictions, including crimes
pertinent part:
[I]n the case of an institution in any State in which State or applicable local law
provides for the licensing of hospitals, (A) is licensed pursuant to such law or (B) is
approved, by the agency of such State or locality responsible for licensing
hospitals, as meeting the standards established for such licensing ....
Id. § 1861(e)(7).
276. 42 C.F.R. § 482.11(a) (2002).
277. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b)(2) (2000). In contrast, Congress does not require providers to
participate in the program, and providers may terminate their agreements with proper notice and
without cause. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b)(I) (2000); see also Berenson & Harris, supra note 141,
at 155 ("Although providers may terminate their agreements without cause, the grounds on
which the Secretary may refuse to enter into an agreement, terminate an agreement, or refuse to
renew an agreement are extremely limited.").
278. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b)(2)(A)-(D) (2000).
279. Id. § 1320a-7; see generally William H. Dow & Dean M. Harris, Exclusion of
International Medical Graduates from Federal Health-Care Programs, 40 MED. CARE 68
(2002).
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related to the program, patient abuse, health care fraud, and controlled
substances, trigger mandatory exclusion from federal health care programs.28°
Other specified conduct may lead to exclusion from the program in the
discretion of the Secretary, such as other convictions involving fraud or
controlled substances, license suspension or revocation, kickback arrangements,
and providing services that were unnecessary or of inadequate quality.281 Thus,
some of the grounds for exclusion are related to health care services, but they
are not limited to conduct involving Medicare or Medicaid patients.282 Other
grounds for exclusion are unrelated to health care services, but are directly
related to financial misconduct in programs that are operated or funded by
government agencies.2"3 None of the statutory grounds for exclusion, however,
would permit the Secretary to exclude a provider for violation of labor or
environmental laws, much less for unproved allegations of such violations.
That is essentially what Congress proposed for non-Medicare procurement
under federal rules that were issued in final form and later revoked. After
publishing a proposed rule in 1999284 and a revised proposal in 2000,285 the
Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) published a final rule
on December 20, 2000, in the waning days of the Clinton Administration.286
Although the Medicare program purchases goods and services under a different
set of procedures, 87 most federal agencies use a system of contracting set forth
280. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(l)-(4) (2000).
281. Id. § 1320a-7(b); see also Berenson & Harris, supra note 141, at 155-56 (suggesting
this power would be used only in "the most egregious cases").
282. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(2), -7(b)(6)(B) (2000) (including conviction of
patient abuse or neglect as grounds for exclusion, as well as providing unnecessary or
inadequate health care services to patients); see also id. § 1320a-7(b)(14) (noting that
individuals may be excluded from participation in federal health care programs for failure to
repay health education loans and scholarships); id. § 1395ccc (using the Medicare program to
collect debts for scholarships and loans by means of offset); 42 C.F.R. § 405.380 (2002)
(detailing procedure for offsetting past-due amounts on scholarships and loan programs against
Medicare payments).
283. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(I)(B) (2000) (indicating criminal activity "relating
to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct"
with respect to any government-financed, nonhealth care program could be grounds for
exclusion).
284. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 64 Fed. Reg. 37,360 (proposed July 9, 1999)
(to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 9, 31).
285. FAR, 65 Fed. Reg. 40,830 (proposed June 30, 2000) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts.
9, 14-15,31,52).
286. FAR, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,255 (proposed Dec. 20, 2000), revoked, 66 Fed. Reg. 66, 986
(Dec. 27, 2001).
287. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-918T, MEDICARE CONTRACTING
REFORM: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN CONTRACTING FOR CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION
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in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).288 Even if a prospective
contractor is in good standing, in the sense that it has not been suspended or
debarred, the government may not award the contract unless the contracting
officer determines that the prospective contractor is "responsible." 289 That
requires, among other things, "a satisfactory record of integrity and business
ethics. 2 90 The new rule was an attempt to define the type of record that would
be considered to be satisfactory.2 91
As set forth in the December 20, 2000 final rule, the contracting officer
would review the proposed contractor's history of legal compliance, not only
for matters related to obtaining and performing government contracts such as
fraud or bid-rigging, but also for matters related to tax, employment,
environmental, and consumer protection laws.292 Although the final rule
specified that the greatest weight would be given to convictions, the rule also
specified that contracting officers would be required to "consider all relevant
credible information," including indictments, adverse decisions by federal
administrative law judges, and administrative complaints that represent an
adjudicated determination by a federal agency, commission, or board.293
Supporters of the new rule relied primarily on the normative argument that
"[t]he Government ought not do business with lawbreakers. '" 294 In addition,
this type of contractor responsibility rule can serve a deterrent function by
providing an incentive for contractors to comply with all applicable laws. 95
However, industry organizations vigorously opposed the new rule on the
grounds that the government already has an adequate system for suspension and
debarment of contractors, and that the existing system is subject to substantive
criteria and procedural protections that would not be available under the vague
contractor responsibility rule.296 In addition, industry representatives argued
SERVICES 2-3 (2001) (comparing the system through which Medicare contracts for the services
of intermediaries and carriers with the system of competitive bidding used by most federal
agencies), available at http://www.gao.gov/index.html.
288. FAR, 48 C.F.R. ch. 1.
289. 48 C.F.R § 9.103 (2002).
290. Id. § 9.104-1(d).
291. See FAR, 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,256 (summarizing the purpose of the rule).
292. 42 C.F.R. § 9.104.3 (2002).
293. Id.
294. FAR, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,986, 66,988 (Dec. 27, 2001) (codified in scattered parts of 48
C.F.R.) (summarizing public comments).
295. Id. ("Only doing business with law abiding contractors provides a positive incentive
for voluntary compliance with tax, environmental, labor, civil rights, and consumer laws, as well
as criminal laws involving contracting and certain other kinds of business activities.").
296. Id. at 66,988-89.
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that contracting officers would lack the expertise and resources to determine
violations of diverse laws, and the new rule could have the practical effect of
interfering with the government's position of neutrality in disputes between
labor and management.2 97 Ultimately, the new administration of George W.
Bush revoked the previous administration's final rule on December 27,2001.298
The FAR Council agreed that the government should only do business with
contractors that comply with the law, but concluded that the appropriate means
to accomplish that goal is the existing system for suspension and debarment.
299
For many of the same reasons, the Medicare statute should not be
amended to provide that a violation of other types of laws would be a basis for
termination of a provider agreement or exclusion from participation in the
Medicare program. Expanding the grounds for termination and exclusion to
include a violation of unrelated laws would require HHS officials, without
expertise or resources, to make complex determinations about other areas of the
law, especially if the action by HHS was based on something less than a
criminal conviction, final civil judgment, or final agency decision. Moreover,
there already is an existing system for termination of provider agreements and
exclusion from the Medicare program. That existing system includes
substantive criteria and procedural protections, and it fulfills the normative
function of making it clear that the government will not "do business with
lawbreakers. ' 30 Finally, with regard to the goal of deterrence, no persuasive
evidence exists that additional sanctions would cause health care organizations
to do any more than they already are doing to promote compliance with the
297. Id. at 66,988; see also Randel K. Johnson, Statement in Support of the Repeal of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation: Public Comment on 65 Fed. Reg. 80,256 Before the Federal
Acquisition Regulatory Council 9 (June 18, 2001) (asserting that unions could abuse the
contracting process by filing claims against potential contractors as a way of pressuring
contractors to agree to their demands and that a potential contractor could file a claim against
another to gain an advantage in the contracting process), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2001/j une/01 -11 0.htmn (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
298. FAR, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,986 (Dec. 27, 2001).
299. See id. at 66,989 ("The suspension and debarment rules contain well-established and
defined decision-making criteria and due process safeguards, which have evolved through case
law precedent and agency practices."). But see Press Release, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Vigorously
Opposes Elimination of Contractor Responsibility Rules, (Dec. 27, 2001) (announcing that
organized labor supported the Clinton Administration's rule and opposed its revocation by the
Bush Administration), available at www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/prl2282001.cfm. As
the press release states, "It is an outrage for the Bush Administration to revoke the contractor
responsibility rules designed to protect the public and the government from corporate
contractors that do not respect labor, civil rights, and environmental laws and consumer
protections." Id.
300. FAR, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,986, 66,988 (Dec. 27, 2001) (summarizing public comments).
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law.30 ' Even if additional deterrence were necessary and effective, the
Medicare program should not be used as a tool to promote compliance with
unrelated statutes and regulations.
B. The Further Use of Medicare to Promote Even Broader Access to Care
The current uses of Medicare, such as the subsidy for disproportionate
share hospitals, indicate that one of the broader purposes of the program is to
promote access to care for those not eligible for Medicare benefits. In theory, it
would be preferable to fund indigent care directly and explicitly, rather than
indirectly and covertly through Medicare payment formulas and unfunded
mandates.30 2 It is very unlikely, however, that a decision could be made in the
political arena to reduce the level of Medicare's support for indigent care or to
eliminate the unfunded mandate for hospitals to provide emergency care.
Nevertheless, it is possible that we could change the ways in which we use
Medicare to support indigent care so that we could address that goal in a more
effective manner.
One possible alternative is to modify the current EMTALA mandate to
focus on important health care needs that do not qualify as medical
emergencies. Another alternative is to also require Medicare-participating
providers to participate in state-sponsored discount or rebate programs that are
approved by the Secretary of the federal HHS. In each case, it would be
necessary for Congress to amend the Medicare statutes because the Secretary
does not currently have the statutory authority to implement these alternatives.
However, no constitutional barriers would prevent these statutory changes
because Congress has substantial flexibility to impose conditions under its
spending power and because Medicare participation is voluntary.0 3
Under current law, a hospital's EMTALA obligation is limited to
determining whether the patient has an emergency medical condition and, if so,
301. See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidelines for Hospitals, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8987 (Feb. 23, 1998) (indicating that health care organizations throughout the country
have already instituted compliance programs that are designed to assure compliance with
applicable laws as a means of gaining favorable treatment under the federal sentencing
guidelines); see also In re Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("The
Guidelines offer powerful incentives for corporations today to have in place compliance
programs to detect violations of law, promptly to report violations to appropriate public officials
when discovered, and to take prompt, voluntary remedial efforts.").
302. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (setting forth indirect means for
accomplishing broad social goals).
303. See supra Part III.A (discussing the requirements and history of EMTALA).
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providing a proper transfer or the additional examination and treatment that is
needed to stabilize the emergency condition. 304 For example, a patient in
cardiac arrest would receive treatment to stabilize the condition, but not
necessarily a coronary artery bypass graft to correct the underlying condition.
A patient with lung cancer might receive emergency treatment for difficulty in
breathing, but not necessarily radiation or chemotherapy to treat the cancer. As
one commentator has explained, EMTALA does not apply to "primary or
urgent care services. 30 5 Aside from the practical difficulty of distinguishing
mandated emergency care from nonmandated urgent care, it is theoretically
problematic to draw a line at emergencies and exclude from the mandate all
other types of medically necessary care. We may have a vague sense that
emergency care is always more important than other medical needs. In some
cases, however, other types of care, such as corrective surgery for a child, may
be more compelling and more justifiable in ethical terms than emergency care.
In addition, it might be more cost-effective to provide primary care, rather than
waiting until the patient's condition deteriorates to the point of qualifying for
"free" emergency care.306
If we accept the existence of EMTALA's unfunded mandate as a given, in
light of the political realities, then the remaining question is whether Medicare-
participating hospitals should also be required to provide certain non-
emergency care, such as prenatal checkups and well-baby visits, without regard
to the patient's ability to pay. From a public health perspective, this
modification of the EMTALA mandate might bring about a significant
improvement in the health status of the population at a very reasonable cost. Of
course, it would be important to conduct empirical research to evaluate the
costs and benefits of this alternative.
If it is supported by the cost-benefit analysis, this alternative could be
implemented by amending the EMTALA statute and its implementing
regulations. Congress has the power to modify the obligations of participating
hospitals, regardless of the hospitals' reliance on the law that was in effect at
the time they executed their provider agreements. 307 As a practical and political
304. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(b) (2000); see supra note 120 (giving statutory definition of
"emergency medical condition," with a specific application to women in labor).
305. Olson, supra note 117, at 480.
306. See Ulen, supra note 146, at 691 ("[O]ne gets a state of affairs in which the indigent
may delay seeking medical attention precisely because it becomes free to them in an
emergency."); see also Hyman, supra note 117, at 51 (recognizing the higher expense of treating
patients in the emergency department setting).
307. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 182-84 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
the industry's challenge to regulations that arguably changed the obligations that hospitals had
accepted under the Hill-Burton program).
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matter, the hospital industry would want something in exchange for
undertaking an expanded EMTALA obligation, but Congress would be
unlikely to eliminate or reduce the existing mandate to provide emergency
screening and stabilization in the hospital emergency department. There may
be room for compromise, however. Congress could eliminate or reduce
hospitals' EMTALA obligations at their off-campus facilities as a quid pro quo
for more effective EMTALA obligations on the main hospital campus.
30 8
Another possible alternative is to amend Section 1866 of the Social
Security Act to require Medicare providers to participate in additional
government-sponsored programs. As discussed above, providers that
participate in Medicare must also participate in the CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA,
and VA medical programs.30 9 In recent years, state governments have
developed a variety of new publicly-sponsored assistance programs that are
designed to promote access to goods and services such as prescription drugs.
Some states have expanded their existing Medicaid programs under federally-
approved demonstration projects,3"0 while the State of Maine also developed a
completely new program, apart from Medicaid, to enable all state residents to
obtain discounts on prescription drugs.3 '
So far, these state-sponsored assistance programs have generally obtained
rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers, but other state programs could be
developed on the basis of rebates from health care providers, suppliers, or
practitioners. By requiring Medicare-participating providers to also participate
in state discount programs, it may be possible to improve access to care. There
is a danger, however, that state programs could impose unreasonable
308. See supra note 119 (discussing proposed amendments to existing regulations
regarding a hospital's off-campus facilities). As part of modifying the EMTALA obligation,
Congress could also reduce the regulatory burden on hospitals by clarifying that EMTALA does
not apply to inpatients. See supra note 119 (discussing the inherent ambiguities of when
EMTALA actually applies).
309. See supra note 113 (discussing these participation requirements).
310. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 226 (D. C.
Cir. 2001) (finding that the federal government lacked authority to approve a Vermont
demonstration project that required manufacturers to pay rebates without any state Medicaid
expenditure); see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 191 F. Supp. 2d 48, 62-
66 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding the identical Maine Medicaid demonstration unlawful on the same
grounds), rev'd, 313 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 2002), amended by No. 02-5110, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4037 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2003).
311. See Pharm. Research& Mfrs. ofAm. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,123 S. Ct. 1855,155 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (2003) (refusing to enjoin a Maine program to obtain funding for discounts through
rebates from manufacturers who choose to participate in the program-if a manufacturer refuses
to participate, that manufacturer's products would be treated less favorably under Maine's
Medicaid program by requiring prior authorization for its drugs).
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requirements on participating providers. Therefore, if Congress were to amend
Section 1866 to add a new requirement that Medicare providers must agree to
participate in state-sponsored programs, that new requirement should be limited
to those state programs approved in advance by the Secretary.
VI. Conclusion
In 1965, Congress merely intended to provide insurance coverage for a
specific group of people and not to provide assistance to the broader
community. In fact, by prohibiting cross-subsidization, Congress made clear its
intent that Medicare funds should not be used for the benefit of non-Medicare
patients. Since 1965, however, Congress has expanded the role of the
Medicare program and used it promote broader public goals, such as providing
financial support for indigent care, rural health care facilities, and graduate
medical education. The role of Medicare has also been expanded by using
participation in the program as a "hook" to impose unfunded mandates that
apply to non-Medicare as well as Medicare patients. As demonstrated above,
Medicare has not been expanded in a calculated manner to accomplish a
previously identified mission, but rather has been expanded in a reactive mode
as a response to a series of largely unrelated concerns.
In their research, Michael Gusmano and Mark Schlesinger found that
policy elites often based their views on the broader uses of Medicare on their
underlying ideological positions.3 12 Liberals were more likely to favor an active
role for the Medicare program in supporting activities such as medical
education, indigent care, and rural facilities, whereas conservatives tended to
believe that Medicare trust funds should only be used for the benefit of
Medicare patients.313 Gusmano and Schlesinger recognized that conservative
elites were not necessarily opposed to any government involvement in those
activities, but generally opposed using the Medicare program for those
purposes. 14 Under that view, direct funding would have the advantages of
greater accountability and competition with other funding priorities.315 In
312. Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 59; see also NASI, supra note 12, at 57
(explaining the distinct ideological differences among policy experts).
313. Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 59.
314. See id. (finding that conservative elites "strongly objected to using money from the
Medicare trust fund").
315. See Newhouse & Wilensky, supra note 213, at 139 (describing the position taken by
the majority of members on the Bipartisan Medicare Commission).
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addition, most economists favor explicit funding of public needs over hidden
cross-subsidization.31 6
Unfortunately, the economist's preference for explicit and adequate
funding is intellectually satisfying, but not politically realistic. After so many
years, it is unreasonable to assume that the scope and functions of the Medicare
program could be significantly reduced and that the broader uses of Medicare
could be untangled from the program. Moreover, many people would argue
that the scope and functions of the Medicare program should not be reduced
and that those broader uses should not be untangled. I will argue, therefore, in
favor of a compromise position of retaining the status quo but providing much
greater transparency.
As other writers have pointed out, the lack of transparency is one of the
most serious problems in the American health care system.a 7 The use of
Medicare to covertly subsidize broader public goals is both a symptom and a
contributor to that problem. According to the NASI Study Panel, if broader
social goals were not connected to the Medicare program, then Congress would
be forced to develop health policy for the nation "much more overtly than at
present. 31 8 That is an accurate statement, but we do not have to give up
completely on the goal of transparency. At the very least, we should try to
encourage more overt development of policy, even if we are not able to
untangle all of those broader goals from the Medicare program. The taxpayers,
who have money deducted from their paychecks for something called
"Medicare," have the right to know what is really being done with their money.
Specifically, we should insist that Congress and the Secretary openly
acknowledge the broader purposes of Medicare and honestly account for its
costs. Rather than continuing to pretend that the hidden subsidies are merely
reimbursement for the higher costs of patient care, Congress and the Secretary
should publicly acknowledge that a portion of Medicare spending is used to
316. See Gbadebo &Reinhardt, supra note 221, at 149 ("Economists... certainly would
like these to be funded adequately and explicitly by society."). But see id. at 152 (concluding
that the moral imperative of funding the safety net outweighs the dictates of economic theory in
this situation).
317. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 42, at 78 ("Virtually everyone involved in the never-
never land of health care thinks-rightly in some cases, wrongly in others-that someone else
will pay the bill, including whatever costs law and legislation may impose."). In addition, David
Hyman and Mark Hall have pointed out that the lack of transparency in the cost of employee
health coverage has contributed to the public opposition to managed care, because employees
did not realize that they were saving their own money as a result of cost containment techniques.
David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers For Employment-Based Health Insurance, II YALE
J. HEALTH POE'Y, L. & ETHics 23, 28 (2001).
318. NASI, supra note 12, at 46.
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support important activities such as indigent care, medical research, and rural
health care facilities.319 In addition, Congress should require the Secretary to
prepare and issue realistic estimates of the cost of complying with unfunded
mandates that are imposed as conditions of participation. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the purposes of Medicare include "ensuring the availability
of quality health care for the broader community, 320 and it is time for Congress
and the Secretary to do the same.
319. See Gusmano & Schlesinger, supra note 14, at 46-47 (suggesting that the legitimacy
of the Medicare program could be enhanced and intergenerational conflict could be reduced by
pursuing collateral functions that benefit people under the age of 65).
320. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 680 (2000); see supra notes 244-272 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's rationale in Fischer).
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